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PAYING TOO DEARLY FOR A WHISTLE:  
PROPERLY PROTECTING 
INTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWERS 
Leonardo Labriola* 
 
In light of substantial disagreement among the circuits on which types of 
whistleblowers Dodd-Frank intends to protect, and newly proposed 
legislation which suggests a solution, this Note inspects Dodd-Frank’s 
whistleblower protections in an effort to better explain which types of 
corporate whistleblowers should and should not be protected.  This Note 
briefly outlines the United States’s repeated history of increased regulation 
following financial crises, culminating in the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank Acts.  It then describes the goals that motivated these acts and how 
whistleblowers play an outsized role in accomplishing those goals.  It also 
examines the critical statute for corporate whistleblower protection—Dodd-
Frank’s section 922—and describes the SEC’s interpretation of that text.  
This Note then contrasts the competing interpretations of section 922 and 
compares the policy results of those interpretations.  It also looks at how 
existing structures within the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
protections from other related whistleblower regimes might inform Dodd-
Frank’s protections.  Finally, this Note proposes a cohesive solution that 
protects internal whistleblowers, respects corporate decision making, and 
furthers Sarbanes-Oxley’s and Dodd-Frank’s goals. 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 2840 
I.  WHISTLEBLOWERS GUARD AGAINST CRISIS ...................................... 2842 
A.  The Repeated History of Financial Crisis .............................. 2842 
B.  What Is a Whistleblower? ....................................................... 2846 
C.  Why Dodd-Frank Protects Whistleblowers ............................ 2847 
1.  Sarbanes-Oxley Set a National Standard for Corporate 
Whistleblower Protection ................................................ 2848 
2.  Dodd-Frank Raised That Standard ................................... 2850 
II.  DODD-FRANK SECTION 922 ............................................................... 2851 
A.  Section 922’s Language and Structure ................................... 2851 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2012, University of 
Colorado.  I would like to thank the Fordham Law Review, Ethan J. Leib, Alexis Jesup, and 
my family and friends for their steadfast support. 
 
2840 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
1.  The Statutory Definition of Whistleblower ..................... 2851 
2.  For Bounties:  Originality of Information ........................ 2852 
3.  For Protection:  Who Hears the Whistle Blow ................ 2853 
B.  The SEC’s Interpretation of Section 922 ................................ 2854 
III.  COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 922 ............................. 2855 
A.  The Courts That Find Ambiguity Defer to the SEC and 
Protect All Internal Whistleblowers ...................................... 2856 
1.  Why the Second Circuit Deferred to the SEC .................. 2856 
2.  Interpretive Merits of Internal Protection ........................ 2858 
3.  Policy Benefits of Internal Protection .............................. 2859 
4.  Policy Challenges to Protecting All Internal 
Whistleblowers ................................................................ 2861 
5.  The WARN Act:  A Proposed Codification of Internal 
Protection ........................................................................ 2862 
B.  Courts That Find No Ambiguity Protect No Internal 
Whistleblowers ...................................................................... 2864 
1.  Why the Fifth Circuit Did Not Defer to the SEC ............. 2864 
2.  Interpretive Merits of External-Only Protection .............. 2866 
3.  Interpretive Challenges to Protecting Only External 
Whistleblowers ................................................................ 2868 
4.  Policy Challenges to Protecting Only External 
Whistleblowers ................................................................ 2869 
a.  Protecting Only External Whistleblowers Would Be 
More Expensive for the SEC ..................................... 2869 
b.  Protecting Only External Whistleblowers Forces 
Corporate Counsel to Act Irrationally ..................... 2871 
C.  Dodd-Frank and Related Statues Protect, but Distinguish, 
Internal Whistleblowers ........................................................ 2872 
1.  Related Whistleblower Regimes ...................................... 2872 
a.  The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act .......... 2872 
b.  The Consumer Financial Protection Act .................... 2873 
c.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act ............................................. 2873 
2.  Existing SEC Structures That Recognize a Difference 
Among Internal Whistleblowers ..................................... 2874 
IV.  WHETHER, WHICH, AND HOW INTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWERS 
SHOULD BE PROTECTED .............................................................. 2876 
INTRODUCTION 
Over fifteen years ago, on December 2, 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy.1  
Enron, once ranked among the “most admired” companies in the world by 
 
 1. Michael W. Peregrine, Enron Still Matters, 15 Years After Its Collapse, N.Y. TIMES:  
DEALBOOK (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/business/dealbook/enron-
still-matters-15-years-after-its-collapse.html [https://perma.cc/7YDQ-8XQT]. 
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Fortune magazine, was an energy giant.2  Mutual funds, private investors, 
and Enron employees padded their accounts with Enron stock options as 
protections against risk.  Then, after years of outperforming the market,3 
Enron suddenly filed for bankruptcy.  After Enron had fraudulently 
misreported its finances for years, the chickens had finally come home to 
roost.4  Enron stock, “which peaked at $90 in August 2000,”5 fell to just $0.26 
per share by the end of November the following year.6  In just three of those 
months, Enron’s stock had fallen from $36 per share to less than $0.50 per 
share.7  The company had collapsed.  Darvin Mitchell, an Enron employee, 
was three years from retiring when he was laid off.8  He had his family’s 
retirement savings in Enron stock.9  He was forced to survive on social 
security.10  Anne Beliveaux, who worked for eighteen years as an assistant 
in Enron’s tax department, was forced to live on $1,600 per month after her 
retirement savings were similarly wiped out.11  When Enron’s CEO Jeffery 
Skilling was sentenced to 292 months in prison, Dawn Powers Martin took 
the opportunity to tell Skilling that she and her daughter would be clipping 
grocery coupons despite her twenty-two years working at Enron.12  Ten 
thousand similarly situated employees lost their jobs and $1.2 billion in life 
savings.13 
Fifteen years later, there are still lessons to be learned from Enron.14  
Several whistleblowers inside Enron had alerted top management of the 
financial reporting violations that Enron was committing.15  Rather than heed 
the warnings of those whistleblowers, Enron’s top executives chose instead 
to fire them.16  If those whistleblowers had legal recourse for their firing, and 
 
 2. Malcolm Gladwell, Open Secrets:  Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too Much 
Information, NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2007), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/08/ 
open-secrets-3 [https://perma.cc/PJ3A-DUQ9]. 
 3. See DUANE GRUBERT & DAVID WIDEMAN, ENRON:  BRUISED BUT STRONG, UPGRADED 
TO OUTPERFORM 3 (2001), http://www.rbcpa.com/enron/ene_sanford_20010921.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2VST-RK7P]. 
 4. Jeffrey Toobin, End Run at Enron, NEW YORKER (Oct. 27, 2003), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/10/27/end-run-at-enron [https://perma.cc/R77G-
5LE6]. 
 5. 401(k) Investors Sue Enron, CNN MONEY (Nov. 26, 2001, 2:36 PM), http:// 
money.cnn.com/2001/11/26/401k/q_retire_enron_re/ [https://perma.cc/D8HZ-28T3]. 
 6. Enron Corporation (ENRN Q) Common Stock Historical Price Table, GILARDI & CO. 
LLC 32, http://www.gilardi.com/pdf/enro13ptable.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https:// 
perma.cc/YK47-C6ZV]. 
 7. Id. at 31–32. 
 8. Analee Bivins, Church Members Not Immune from Enron Woes, CHRISTIAN CHRON. 
(Mar. 2002), http://www.christianchronicle.org/article/church-members-not-immune-from-
enron-woes [https://perma.cc/4SXL-B79S]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Gladwell, supra note 2. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Toobin, supra note 4. 
 14. See Peregrine, supra note 1. 
 15. See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
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a federal audience for their claims, perhaps Enron’s collapse might have been 
avoided.17 
In an attempt to encourage whistleblowing and prevent another such 
catastrophe, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) and the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(“Dodd-Frank”) sought to protect and reward whistleblowers.18  However, in 
Dodd-Frank, Congress created an arguable ambiguity leaving room for courts 
to disagree on the extent of this whistleblower protection.19 
This Note argues that the solutions to this ambiguity are, so far, inadequate.  
Either they fail to adequately protect internal whistleblowers or fail to accord 
the proper degree of discretion to corporate compliance regimes.  Failing in 
the former ignores the pragmatic realities of corporate whistleblowing.  
Failing in the latter ignores the goals of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Both face 
potentially insurmountable interpretive and policy challenges.  This Note 
recommends a more coherent solution that looks to the extant structures 
within and without Dodd-Frank to relieve certain internal whistleblowers of 
the burden of proof to show retaliatory action while still requiring that burden 
of proof for other internal whistleblowers. 
Part I briefly outlines the United States’s repeated history of increased 
regulation following financial crises, culminating in the Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank Acts.  It then describes the goals that motivated these Acts and 
how corporate whistleblowers play an outsized role in accomplishing those 
goals.  Part II examines the critical statute for corporate whistleblower 
protection—Dodd-Frank’s section 922—and describes the SEC’s 
interpretation of that text.  Next, Part III contrasts the Second and Fifth 
Circuits’ competing interpretations of section 922 and compares the policy 
results of those interpretations.  It also looks at how existing structures within 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or “the Commission”) and 
the protections from other related whistleblower regimes might inform Dodd-
Frank’s protections.  Finally, Part IV proposes a cohesive solution that better 
protects internal whistleblowers, respects corporate decision making, and 
furthers Sarbanes-Oxley’s and Dodd-Frank’s goals. 
I.  WHISTLEBLOWERS GUARD AGAINST CRISIS 
Congress has long met financial crises with increased financial regulation.  
Two of the most recent and significant of these regulations are Sarbanes-
Oxley and Dodd-Frank.  These two acts, in relevant part, create protections 
and rewards for corporate whistleblowers so as to better discover securities 
violations and thereby better enforce securities laws. 
A.  The Repeated History of Financial Crisis 
Whistleblower protections and rewards have only recently developed as 
congressional solutions to financial crises.  However, financial crises are not 
 
 17. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
 19. See infra Part II.B. 
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new phenomena in American history.  Whenever America has been faced 
with wide-scale financial crises, Congress has responded by passing broad 
legislation that uses the tools of financial regulation to alleviate the crisis and, 
purportedly, to prevent any similar future crises.20  This stretches as far back 
as the Civil War, which itself could be viewed as the most direct federal-level 
labor regulation in American history.  Ultimately, the war left the American 
South decimated and in rapid economic decline.21  In response, Congress 
passed the National Bank Act22 in an effort to centralize and regulate the 
American banking system, if not begin in earnest to establish a national 
bank.23  After the “Panic of 1907,” which caused a rippling 25 percent loss 
in the New York Stock Exchange over the course of just two months,24 
Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, which created the National 
Monetary Commission25 that ultimately established the Federal Reserve 
under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.26  The Great Depression that 
followed Black Tuesday motivated Congress to create arguably the largest 
regulatory regime in American history.  This “New Deal” yielded the 
Banking Act of 1933,27 the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,28 the Social 
 
 20. William D. Cohan, Introduction to DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL:  
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES, at xi (2011) 
(paraphrasing Yale economist Arthur Okun as stating that “a rip-roaring financial crisis is 
bound to result in a new swath of financial reglation”); Zizi Petkova, Comment, Interpreting 
the Anti-Retaliation Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573, 574 (2016) 
(pointing out the “long-standing pattern of remedial Congressional action following major 
systemic [economic] failures”). 
 21. See generally JEREMY ATACK & PETER PASSELL, A NEW ECONOMIC VIEW OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY:  FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1940, at 378–80 (2d ed. 1994) (asserting that 
“many have accepted war damage as the primary source of the southern economic decline”). 
 22. Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864); see also 12 U.S.C. § 38; Jonathan L. Levin, In Search of 
the National Bank Act, 97 BANKING L.J. 741, 742–44 (1980). 
 23. See JAMES ELIOT MASON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1956–1991, at 24 (1997) (calling the National Bank Act of 1863 “the nation’s 
first comprehensive effort to establish a national banking system and a unified monetary 
system”). 
 24. Carola Frydman et al., Economic Effects of Runs on Early “Shadow Banks”:  Trust 
Companies and the Impact of the Panic of 1907, 123 J. POL. ECON. 902, 917 (2015). 
 25. Sayre Ellen Dykes, The Establishment and Evolution of the Federal Reserve Board:  
1913–23, 75 FED. RES. BULL. 227, 227 (1989); see also J. Laurence Laughlin, The Aldrich-
Vreeland Act, 16 J. POL. ECON. 489, 492–93 (1908) (“In the last session of Congress, following 
the panic of 1907, the demand for new legislation contained the crude expectation that the law 
would prevent the possibility of future panics.”). 
 26. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (establishing “a more 
effective supervision of banking in the United States”); see Dykes, supra note 25, at 227. 
 27. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (establishing the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and formally separating any national banks and their 
state member banks from issuers of securities).  Parts of this act are more familiarly known as 
“the Glass-Steagall Act.” Cohan, supra note 20, at xii. 
 28. Ch. 404, § 2, 48 Stat. 881, 881–82 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012) (establishing the 
SEC). 
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Security Act,29 the National Labor Relations Act,30 and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.31 
However, these historical responses to financial crises served only as the 
vanguards for Congress’s more recent actions in similar contemporary crises.  
As the economy reeled from the dot-com crash in 2002,32 Enron, MCI 
WorldCom, and Tyco, all financial behemoths,33 were discovered to have 
committed wide-scale fraud at the executive level,34 causing unrecoverable 
drops in thousands of Americans’ mutual and retirement funds, 401(k)s, and, 
in some cases, their entire life savings.35  To prevent this institutionalized 
fraud from happening again, Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley,36 which 
 
 29. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 301) (establishing the Social 
Security Board). 
 30. Ch. 372, § 3, 49 Stat. 449, 451 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151) (establishing the 
National Labor Relations Board). 
 31. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 201). 
 32. Petkova, supra note 20, at 574. 
 33. Enron was the seventh largest publicly traded company in the United States when it 
declared bankruptcy on December 2, 2001. FREDERICK D. LIPMAN, WHISTLEBLOWERS:  
INCENTIVES, DISINCENTIVES, AND PROTECTION STRATEGIES 70 (2012).  MCI WorldCom was 
the “second-largest long-distance provider and a major carrier of Internet traffic.” Simon 
Romero, Turmoil at WorldCom:  The Overview; WorldCom Facing Charges of Fraud; 
Inquiries Expand, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/27/ 
business/turmoil-worldcom-overview-worldcom-facing-charges-fraud-inquiries-expand.html 
[https://perma.cc/FU64-HAGC]. 
 34. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Collapse:  The Overview; 
Arthur Andersen Fires an Executive for Enron Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/16/business/enron-s-collapse-overview-arthur-andersen-
fires-executive-for-enron-orders.html [https://perma.cc/FN3G-ZUEA]; Simon Romero & 
Floyd Norris, New Disclosures from WorldCom May Add to Accounting Scandal, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 2, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/02/business/new-disclosures-from-
worldcom-may-add-to-accounting-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/PB93-JDKY]; Andrew 
Ross Sorkin & Alex Berenson, Corporate Conduct:  The Overview; Tyco Admits Using 
Accounting Tricks to Inflate Earnings, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2002), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2002/12/31/business/corporate-conduct-overview-tyco-admits-using-
accounting-tricks-inflate-earnings.html [https://perma.cc/5UUV-QN3P].  However, this is not 
an exhaustive list of the companies found to have committed wide-scale fraud during this time 
or even representative of the types of fraud being committed. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn:  Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. 
L. REV. 915, 924–25 (2003) (naming other companies that contributed to the financial 
misfeasance of the Enron era including Qwest Communications, Adelphia Communications, 
Global Crossing, AOL-Time Warner, Xerox, Rite Aid, and even the corporation whose CEO 
allegedly fed insider information to Martha Stewart). 
 35. See, e.g., 401(k) Investors Sue Enron, supra note 5; see also Geoffrey Colvin, You’re 
on Your Own:  That Enron Workers Lost Life Savings Is Just Another Sign That the Short Era 
of Economic Security Is Over, FORTUNE (Feb. 4, 2002), http://archive.fortune.com/ 
magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2002/02/04/317527/index.htm [https://perma.cc/4U26-
CHV4]; Christopher Ketcham, Enron’s Human Toll:  How Employees of the Energy Trader 
Got Sucked into Stock Market Euphoria—And Catastrophe, SALON (Jan. 23, 2002), 
http://www.salon.com/2002/01/23/enron_toll/ [https://perma.cc/4QRW-2RL3]. 
 36. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., 
WHISTLEBLOWER LAW:  A GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES, at xi 
(2004) (describing how, when urging Congress to pass Sarbanes-Oxley, Representative Mike 
Enzi said, “It had to be earthshaking because we are trying to counteract the tremors from the 
volcanic action of the mountaintop being blown off such companies as Enron, WorldCom, 
Global Crossing, and others”). 
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created institutional incentives for corporations to improve their internal 
compliance and reporting mechanisms.37  Then, despite nearly a century of 
increasing regulation,38 America experienced the worst economic crisis since 
the Great Depression.39  Between October 2007 and October 2009, 
unemployment doubled, the S&P 500 lost over half its value, and 45 percent 
of the world’s total wealth was destroyed.40  To prevent such a crisis from 
happening again, Congress passed Dodd-Frank in 2010.41  Dodd-Frank 
includes provisions that overlap with the previous financial reporting 
incentives and requirements established by Sarbanes-Oxley.42  Among other 
 
 37. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1162 (2014); see also ROBERT G. VAUGHN, 
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 152 (2012) (“The whistleblower 
provision of [Sarbanes-Oxley] was the most comprehensive private-sector whistleblower law 
ever enacted in the United States.”). 
 38. A notable legislative interruption in the otherwise swelling tide of increased securities 
regulation was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, which repealed many 
of Glass-Steagall’s protective provisions. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization 
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999).  Some have called into question 
the wisdom of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and late twentieth-century financial deregulation more 
generally, blaming these models for exacerbating the 2008 financial crisis. See generally 
Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services Industry Puts Together Let No Person Put 
Asunder:  How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to the 2008–2009 American Capital 
Markets Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 371 (2010). 
 39. SKEEL, supra note 20, at 1; see also GEORGE SOROS, THE NEW PARADIGM FOR 
FINANCIAL MARKETS:  THE CREDIT CRISIS OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS, at vii (2008) 
(describing the 2008 financial crisis as “the worst . . . since the 1930s”).  In brief, the 2008 
financial crisis was caused when a 2006 slump in the housing market revealed massive 
instability among lenders due to wide-scale subprime mortgage lending. Crash Course:  The 
Origins of the Financial Crisis, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article [https:// 
perma.cc/TG48-UQKV]. 
  The sub-prime lending itself was at least partially incentivized by the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac), and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) “continu[ing] to 
directly bear credit risk by guaranteeing mortgage-backed securities.” Michael Simkovic, 
Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J. 213, 219 (2013).  This 
underlying risk came largely as a surprise to lenders because Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s 
over-rated triple-A tranches of collateralized debt obligations backed by the pooled subprime 
mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. See Crash Course:  The Origins of the Financial 
Crisis, supra.  For a comprehensive analysis, see generally Michael S. Barr, The Financial 
Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2012). 
 40. Jeff Vogt, Note, Don’t Tell Your Boss?:  Blowing the Whistle on the Fifth Circuit’s 
Elimination of Anti-Retaliation Protection for Internal Whistleblowers Under Dodd-Frank, 67 
OKLA. L. REV. 353, 353 (2015). 
 41. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Henry Klehm III et al., Securities 
Enforcement Has Crossed the Border:  Regulatory Authorities Respond to the Financial Crisis 
With a Call for Greater International Cooperation, but Where Will That Lead, 13 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 927, 936 (2011) (noting that the 2008 crisis “triggered ambitious legislative reform by 
the United States Congress, culminating in the historic [Dodd-Frank Act]”); see also Cohan, 
supra note 20, at xiv. 
 42. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C § 26 (2012) (adopting a definition of “monetary sanctions” in the 
context of commodities whistleblower protections that includes monies in a disgorgement fund 
pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley in 15 U.S.C. § 7246(b)); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) 
(integrating Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower reporting protections in section 922); see also 
infra Part I.C (discussing the significant ways in which Dodd-Frank builds on, modifies, and 
overlaps with Sarbanes-Oxley).  Sarbanes-Oxley, crafted in the wake of wide-scale accounting 
fraud, sought to improve financial accountability in large public corporations, and by many 
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things, it provides extensive protections and rewards for corporate insiders 
who “blow the whistle” when they discover corporate securities violations 
within their organizations.43 
These two acts protect and reward whistleblowers for good reason:  
employee tips constitute the single most effective way to expose corporate 
fraud, constituting over 40 percent of all cases.44  This method accounts for 
more reports than the next three highest methods—managerial review, 
internal audit, and accidental discovery—combined.45  From the enforcement 
side, only 8.8 percent of reports come from external audit, surveillance or 
monitoring, and police notification.46  Put another way, tips from 
whistleblowers are thirteen times more effective than all external methods of 
exposing possible violations.47  Decentralizing financial enforcement 
mechanisms by appropriately protecting and rewarding whistleblowers will 
play a crucial role in stopping America’s long historical trend of experiencing 
financial crises.48 
B.  What Is a Whistleblower? 
This section provides a broad definition of the term “whistleblower.”  This 
Note ultimately shows that defining “whistleblower” is more difficult than 
one may initially imagine.  For general purposes, however, a whistleblower 
is any person within an organization who acts to make public some 
information related to “possible or actual nontrivial wrongdoing” within that 
organization.49  The term’s positive connotations evoke images of an 
 
measures it has been successful in doing so. See Jesse Eisinger, To Envision Dodd-Frank’s 
Future, Look to Its Predecessor, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALBOOK (Feb. 8, 2012), http:// 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/to-envision-dodd-franks-future-look-to-its-predecessor/ 
(“[Sarbanes-Oxley] was a response to an epidemic in corporate accounting fraud that swept 
American business in the late 1990s and early 2000s. . . .  The [2008] financial crisis included 
accounting problems. . . .  But at its heart, the financial crisis wasn’t an accounting 
scandal. . . .  [C]orporate America weathered the worst of the downturn without a series of 
major accounting frauds.”) [https://perma.cc/NLY3-CRC4].  Dodd-Frank, on the other hand, 
was aimed more directly at the concentrated financial services industry and sought generally 
to protect securities investors. Id. 
 43. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.  This Note uses the term “protection” to refer to a 
whistleblower’s legislated right of action against an employer who retaliates against the 
whistleblower for making her report. See infra Part II.A.3.  This Notes uses the terms “reward” 
and “bounty” interchangeably to refer to the monetary award given to a whistleblower when 
her report leads to a successful enforcement action against the organization. See infra Part 
II.A.2. 
 44. LIPMAN, supra note 33, at 2. 
 45. Id. at 3 fig.I.1.  Managerial review accounts for 15.4 percent of cases, internal audit 
accounts for 13.9 percent of cases, and accidental discovery accounts for 8.3 percent of cases. 
Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110–11 (2010). 
 48. See infra Part I.C. 
 49. ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING:  WHEN IT WORKS—AND WHY 3–4 
(2003).  When Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to protect government 
whistleblowers’ freedom of speech, the wrongdoing it envisioned was “[illegality], or 
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific 
danger to public health or safety.” Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 
§ 101, 92 Stat. 1111, 1114 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(9)(A)–(B)). 
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impartial referee calling fouls on the field to stop the action50 or an old-time 
London bobby alerting officers and onlookers of a crime in progress.51  For 
the purposes of this Note, there are two critically different types of 
whistleblowers within an organization:  internal whistleblowers (who report 
suspected wrongdoing to an authority within the organization) and external 
whistleblowers (who report suspected wrongdoing to an enforcement 
authority outside the organization).52 
C.  Why Dodd-Frank Protects Whistleblowers 
Dodd-Frank is an ambitious set of reforms, but it did not start from 
scratch.53  While Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank were ostensibly aimed at 
different targets, they used similar tools to enforce their compliance 
mechanisms.54  Both created regulatory regimes to achieve their goals.55  
Both relied, in part, on forcing corporate boards of directors to establish 
various internal committees.56  And both provide significant incentives for 
corporate insiders to blow the whistle on financial malfeasance and securities 
law violations.57  However, because Sarbanes-Oxley’s protections proved 
insufficient to adequately incentivize whistleblowing, Dodd-Frank added 
monetary rewards for whistleblowers when their reports resulted in 
successful enforcement actions.58 
 
 50. See Alan F. Westin, Introduction:  Why Whistleblowing Is on the Rise, in WHISTLE 
BLOWING!:  LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 1–2 (Alan F. Westin ed., 1981). 
 51. See JOHNSON, supra note 49, at 4.  Arguably, Ralph Nader coined the term in the 1970s 
in an attempt to improve the reputation of insiders who expose scandal. See Naseem Faqihi, 
Choosing Which Rule to Break First:  An In-House Attorney Whistleblower’s Choices After 
Discovering a Possible Federal Securities Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3341, 3346 
(2014); David Bollier, Chapter 4:  Let the Information Flow, NADER BLOG (Jan. 5, 2004), 
https://blog.nader.org/2004/01/05/chapter-4-let-the-information-flow/ [https://perma.cc/XL6 
T-A6LJ]; see also Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives:  Making Corporate Whistleblowing 
Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 491 
(2012) (describing the way in which policymakers used to refer to whistleblowers only in 
negative terms such as “rats” and “snitches”); Geneva Campbell, Comment, Snitch or Savior?:  
How the Modern Cultural Acceptance of Pharmaceutical Company Employee External 
Whistleblowing Is Reflected in Dodd-Frank and the Affordable Care Act, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
565, 566 & n.4 (2013) (giving a brief and interesting history of the term “snitch”). 
 52. This Note also describes “simultaneous” reporting, which is a scenario in which a 
whistleblower makes both external and internal reports of the same incident. See infra notes 
207–11 and accompanying text.  This Note does not consider the other common type of 
external whistleblower—the whistleblower who reports suspected wrongdoing to the public 
through news media or information-leaking organizations. 
 53. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 54. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 55. While Dodd-Frank creates an entire administrative agency (the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection), 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012), and Sarbanes-Oxley creates a nonprofit 
corporation (the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a), both 
adopt enforcement responsibilities within their respective acts. 
 56. Sarbanes-Oxley forced certain corporate boards of directors to establish and 
effectively maintain an audit committee. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(1)(A).  Dodd-Frank forced 
certain corporate boards of directors to establish and effectively maintain a compensation 
committee. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3(a)(1). 
 57. See 15 U.S.C. 78u-6; 18 U.S.C. § 1514a; infra Part I.C.1–2. 
 58. See infra Part II.C.3. 
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1.  Sarbanes-Oxley Set a National Standard 
for Corporate Whistleblower Protection 
[Sarbanes-Oxley] was a direct response to the financial collapse of two 
major multinational corporations, Enron and WorldCom, and a reaction to 
the “fraud and greed” that was blamed for these failures.  Congress intended 
that the law would “play a crucial role in restoring trust in the financial 
markets” by ensuring that “corporate fraud and greed” would be “better 
detected, prevented and prosecuted.”59 
Only after millions of investors and pensioners had lost billions of dollars 
did the public learn that employees both at Enron and WorldCom had 
previously identified the fraud and were silenced when they tried to report 
it.60  During its investigations into the Enron scandal and in passing Sarbanes-
Oxley, the Senate Judiciary Committee found that senior Enron Vice 
President Sherron Watkins had previously “attempted to report or ‘blow the 
whistle’ on fraud”61 directly to Enron’s Joint Chief Executive Officer and 
Chairman of the Board Kenneth Lay.62  Rather than address the underlying 
issue, Enron executives immediately went to their outside counsel to inquire 
as to the “risks associated with discharging . . . employees who report 
allegations of improper accounting practices.”63  Presented with the same 
choice on several occasions, Enron chose to fire employees who reported 
fraud rather than fire the accounting firm that committed the fraud.64 
In complex corporate fraud schemes, corporate insiders are the only 
witnesses to fraud who can report “who knew what, and when.”65  For this 
reason, the Senate Judiciary Committee found that a “‘corporate code of 
silence’ not only hampers investigations, but also creates a climate where 
ongoing wrongdoing can occur with virtual impunity.”66  While the law at 
the time already protected government employees who acted “in the public 
interest by reporting wrongdoing,”67 “employees of publicly traded 
companies who blow the whistle on fraud and protect investors” were 
 
 59. KOHN ET AL., supra note 36, at xi. 
 60. See id.  Time Magazine subsequently named two such whistleblowers, Sherron 
Watkins and Cynthia Cooper, “Persons of the Year” in 2002. Richard Lacayo & Amanda 
Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 30; see supra notes 32–35 and 
accompanying text. 
 61. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5 (2002). 
 62. VAUGHN, supra note 37, at 151; see also Text of Letter to Enron’s Chairman After 
Departure of Chief Executive, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/ 
01/16/business/text-of-letter-to-enron-s-chairman-after-departure-of-chief-executive.html 
[https://perma.cc/7754-SD36]. 
 63. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5. 
 64. See id. (citing New York Times and Houston Chronicle reports that a top risk 
management official at Enron and a partner at Andersen (Enron’s accounting firm), among 
others, suffered negative employment actions as a result of reporting concerns over Enron’s 
accounting practices). 
 65. Id. at 10. 
 66. Id. at 5. 
 67. Id. at 10. 
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completely without protection.68  With half of all Americans invested in 
public companies, such a disparity “fails to serve the public good.”69 
By enacting Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress set a “national floor for employee 
protections in the context of publicly traded companies”70 in order to unify 
the “patchwork and vagaries of . . . state laws”71 protecting employees who 
reported fraud.  In response to the Senate conference committee report that 
recommended additional whistleblower protections, Senator Patrick Leahy 
stated:  “[T]hese corporate insiders are the key witnesses that need to be 
encouraged to report fraud and help prove it in court . . . .  There is no way 
we could have known about [the high-level corporate fraud at Enron] without 
that kind of whistleblower.”72 
To encourage the reporting of illegal activity, Sarbanes-Oxley integrated 
extensive “top-down” internal control measures that forced securities issuers 
and public companies to create and maintain internal compliance 
mechanisms.73  However, while creating avenues to report wrongdoing 
within a corporation may be necessary to prevent corporate fraud, it is not 
sufficient if no one makes use of them.74  One roadblock to establishing a 
successful whistleblowing regime is the very real threat of retaliation that 
whistleblowers face.75  Therefore, Sarbanes-Oxley takes an additional step in 
an attempt to assuage these fears:  it protects whistleblowers against 
retaliation when they choose to report information that they “reasonably 
believe[] constitutes a violation of . . . any rule or regulation of the 
[SEC] . . . [to] a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or 
such other person working for the employer who has the authority to 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 20. 
 71. Id. at 19. 
 72. 148 CONG. REC. S7358 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 73. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012) (requiring an “executive officer” and a “financial 
officer” to sign their corporation’s annual or quarterly report to the Commission certifying that 
they “are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls; have designed such 
internal controls to ensure that material information relating to the [company] is made known 
to such officers . . . ; have evaluated the effectiveness of the [company’s] internal 
controls . . . ; and have presented in the report their conclusions about the effectiveness of their 
internal controls . . . .”); 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4) (requiring that public companies’ audit 
committees “establish procedures for . . . the confidential, anonymous submission by 
employees of the [company] of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing 
matters” or be forcibly unlisted from the national securities exchanges and national securities 
associations).  For a general overview on the corporate governance systems encouraged by the 
Dodd-Frank Amendments to Sarbanes-Oxley, see Nick M. Beermann, Understanding SOX 
Whistleblower Protections, in UNDERSTANDING SOX WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS:  
LEADING LAWYERS ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS AND RECOGNIZING/PREVENTING 
CONDUCT THAT LEADS TO CLAIMS 27 (2016). 
 74. Even as early as 2001, the New York Stock Exchange had already instituted widely 
adopted rules requiring publicly listed companies to institute substantially similar board-level 
financial auditing mechanisms, and, in fact, Enron’s 2001 proxy statement was “a pristine 
example of compliance” with these rules. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of 
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1334–35 (2002). 
 75. See infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text. 
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investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).”76  It also sets a procedure 
by which a whistleblower may seek relief for a discriminatory action or 
discharge77 and entitles a prevailing whistleblower to compensatory 
damages.78 
Unfortunately, however, Sarbanes-Oxley’s measures have been 
insufficient to encourage the whistleblowing that the SEC relies on for 
successful enforcement.79  In fact, there is no evidence that the whistleblower 
protection provided by Sarbanes-Oxley has had any effect on the total 
percentage of frauds brought to light.80  Even at its most effective, Sarbanes-
Oxley sought narrowly to prevent accounting fraud81 but was inadequate to 
protect against widespread financial manipulation and to prevent financial 
crisis.82  The crisis of 2008 made this deficiency all the more apparent.83  
Sarbanes-Oxley could not stand alone if Congress wished to ensure structural 
integrity in the American financial market. 
2.  Dodd-Frank Raised That Standard 
Dodd-Frank describes itself as “[a]n Act [t]o promote the financial stability 
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system.”84  Not surprisingly, because corporate insiders remain the 
only firsthand witnesses to corporate malfeasance who can report “who knew 
what, and when,”85 encouraging whistleblowing is a critical mechanism for 
accomplishing Dodd-Frank’s lofty goals. 
The financial crisis in 2008 that gave birth to Dodd-Frank “create[d] a 
greater reliance on whistleblowers and whistleblowing laws.”86  And yet, 
while Sarbanes-Oxley protected whistleblowers against retaliation, it did not 
give them any financial incentive to report wrongdoing.87  To create these 
 
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). 
 77. Id. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) (adopting the existing procedures in 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)). 
 78. Id. § 1514A(c)(1)–(2).  Such damages include back pay and special damages including 
litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees. Id. 
 79. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 80. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 
2216 (2010). 
 81. See supra note 42. 
 82. Compare Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits 
in the Post-SOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2007) (defining three of Sarbanes-
Oxley’s “four major goals” as self-regulatory mechanisms:  improving corporate governance, 
strengthening financial reporting and disclosure, and improving corporate internal controls 
and auditor performance), with Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 
29 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 92 (2012) (“[The 2008 crisis] made painfully clear what should have 
been apparent all along:  that financial institutions cannot be left to regulate themselves.”). 
 83. See supra note 42. 
 84. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).  Others have rephrased this plain 
description, preferring instead to say Dodd-Frank intends “to limit the risk of contemporary 
finance . . . [and] to limit the damage caused by the failure of a large financial institution.” 
SKEEL, supra note 20, at 4. 
 85. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002) (commenting on Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower 
protections). 
 86. VAUGHN, supra note 37, at 157. 
 87. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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incentives, and thereby increase whistleblowing and corporate compliance, 
Dodd-Frank included section 922.88 
Undoubtedly, Dodd-Frank seeks to provide general protection and rewards 
for whistleblowers.89  However, federal district and circuit courts, the SEC, 
and various scholars disagree on whether Dodd-Frank specifically protects 
only external whistleblowers who report to the SEC or if Dodd-Frank also 
protects internal whistleblowers who report to their own supervisors.90 
II.  DODD-FRANK SECTION 922 
Section 922 begins by defining a whistleblower generally91 and then 
defines those whistleblowing acts it intends to protect and reward.92  In light 
of arguable ambiguity in these definitions, the SEC has issued a rule to clarify 
Dodd-Frank’s definition of whistleblower.93 
A.  Section 922’s Language and Structure 
Section 922 outlines specific criteria by which an employee with relevant 
information may qualify as a whistleblower.  Additionally, it outlines the 
ways in which she may avail herself of the SEC’s financial rewards and 
employment protection when she discloses potentially illegal activity. 
1.  The Statutory Definition of Whistleblower 
In section 922(a)(6), Dodd-Frank explicitly defines whistleblower as “any 
individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the 
securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or 
regulation, by the Commission.”94  After defining whistleblowers generally, 
the statute creates a system of incentives and protections for whistleblowers 
who otherwise may have been reluctant to share their information.95 
 
 88. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012) (“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and 
Protection” (emphasis added)), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (“Whistleblower Protection for 
Employees of Publicly Traded Companies” (emphasis added)). 
 89. See infra Part II. 
 90. Compare infra Part II.B, with infra Part III.A, and infra Part III.B. 
 91. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 92. See infra Part II.A.2–3. 
 93. See infra Part II.B. 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).  When a whistleblower makes her report to the 
Commission or to another authority outside the organization of which she is a part, she is 
referred to as an “external whistleblower.” See infra note 115 and accompanying text 
(describing an internal whistleblower—an employee who reports a violation to a supervisor or 
someone else within the organization). 
 95. A common complaint of the securities whistleblower regime under Sarbanes-Oxley 
was that it failed to provide monetary rewards and professional protections adequate to 
incentivize whistleblowers to actually report violations. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX 
and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1773 (2007); see also Richard Moberly, 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions:  Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 27 (2012) 
(“Unfortunately, even if Sarbanes-Oxley encouraged employees to report more frequently, the 
Act often failed to protect them from reprisals and failed to compensate them consistently for 
the retaliation they suffered.”). 
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2.  For Bounties:  Originality of Information 
One significant addition Dodd-Frank made to Sarbanes-Oxley was the way 
in which it provides financial rewards to whistleblowers.96  Instead of merely 
protecting the whistleblower against financial loss in case of retaliation, it 
also provides the whistleblower an opportunity for financial gain.97  If a 
whistleblower meets certain criteria and her report results in the SEC 
imposing sanctions98 against the violating organization, the SEC will 
“award”99 that whistleblower 10–30 percent of the total sanction it collects 
from the violating organization.100 
One criterion for the collection of a monetary reward is originality of 
information.  To collect a bounty under Dodd-Frank, a whistleblower must 
voluntarily provide “original information” to the Commission.101  The statute 
defines original information as “information that is derived from the 
independent knowledge or analysis of a whistleblower; is not known to the 
Commission from any other source . . . and is not exclusively derived from 
an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a governmental 
 
 96. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b). 
 97. Compare id. (describing Dodd-Frank’s whistleblowing rewards), with Part I.C.1 
(describing Sarbanes-Oxley’s retaliation protection). 
 98. The sanctions must total more than $1 million for a whistleblower to collect a bounty 
based on Dodd-Frank’s definition of a “covered judicial or administrative action.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(a)(1). 
 99. Many scholars refer to this award more fittingly as a “bounty.” See, e.g., Jennifer M. 
Pacella, Inside or Out?:  The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s Antiretaliation 
Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 727 (2014) (referring to Dodd-
Frank’s whistleblower award system as a “bounty scheme”). 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)–(c).  The award or bounty amount is increased or decreased 
according to factors under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B).  Because the SEC imposes incredibly 
high sanctions for major securities violations, these bounties have been accordingly 
astronomical. See Amelia Toy Rudolph, If a Whistle Blows In-House Does It Still Make a 
Sound?:  Issues Regarding Internal Whistleblowers Under Dodd-Frank (pt. 1), PRAC. LAW. 
Aug. 2016, at 57, 57 (“Under this program, the SEC has authorized over 30 monetary awards 
to whistleblowers through May 2016, including one award in 2014 for over $30 million and 
another award in 2015 for the statutory maximum of 30% . . . .  In May 2016 alone, the SEC 
announced three whistleblower awards totaling between $9 and $10 million, each to corporate 
insiders.”); Press Release, SEC, SEC Awards More Than $14 Million to Whistleblower (Oct. 
1, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539854258#.UoY 
fjo0mwl0 (reporting a $14 million whistleblower award, the SEC’s highest award as of 
October 2013) [https://perma.cc/QQ6G-TLYG]; Ed Beeson, Three Little Words:  Confusion 
over Dodd-Frank Is Leaving Whistleblowers Exposed, LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2016, 8:43 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/838091 (reporting a $22 million award given in August 
2016, a $17 million award given in June 2016, and a total of $107 million in rewards given 
since the program’s inception) [https://perma.cc/6EV7-7BDC].  Whether the SEC’s 
aggressive reward system will continue under President Donald Trump remains to be seen. 
See Carmen Germaine, Big SEC Whistleblower Bounties Won’t Change with Trump, LAW360 
(Nov. 14, 2016, 9:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/862235/big-sec-whistleblower-
bounties-won-t-change-with-trump [https://perma.cc/TT9Z-77DF]. But see C. Ryan Barber, 
Could Donald Trump’s SEC Soften Enforcement of Severance Agreements?, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 
16, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202772529048/Could-Donald-Trumps-
SEC-Soften-Enforcement-of-Severance-Agreements?slreturn=20170026141958 
[https://perma.cc/E7CV-G792]. 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1). 
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report, hearing, audit, or investigation.”102  The SEC subsequently refined 
this definition by issuing rules to define “independent knowledge” and 
“independent analysis,” which are not defined in the statute.103  “Independent 
knowledge” is “factual information . . . not derived from publicly available 
sources.”104  Additionally, 
[a] whistleblower who learns about possible violations only through a 
company’s internal investigation will ordinarily be excluded from claiming 
“independent knowledge” by . . . Rules 21F-4(b)(4)(i), (ii), and (iii) 
(relating to attorneys, auditors, and other persons who may be involved in 
the conduct of internal investigations), or by Rule 21F-4(b)(4)(vi) 
(excluding information learned from such individuals).105 
Combining these rules on independent knowledge and original information 
with the bounty provisions of the statute means that corporate officers, 
compliance personnel, and attorneys would usually be precluded from 
collecting a bounty for reporting potential violations to the SEC when they 
learn of such information in their capacity as internal investigators.106 
However, in order to extend protection against retaliatory employment 
actions, the statute states that “[n]o employer may [retaliate107] against[] a 
whistleblower . . . because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower—in 
providing information to the Commission in accordance with this section.”108  
Based on this close reading, the Commission stated in Rule 21F-2(b)(1)(iii) 
that the retaliation protections apply to whistleblowers irrespective of 
whether they are ultimately entitled to an award.109  Such a reading, 
according to the Commission, is “compelled by the text of [section 
922(h)(1)].”110 
Therefore, nothing in the language of Dodd-Frank prevents the SEC from 
extending protection to a whistleblower who provides information to the 
SEC, even when that information is not original information that qualifies for 
a bounty. 
3.  For Protection:  Who Hears the Whistle Blow 
In its antiretaliation provision, section 922 stipulates that an employer may 
not “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in 
any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower” because the 
whistleblower has “provid[ed] information to the Commission in accordance 
 
 102. Id. § 78u-6(a)(3)(A)–(C). 
 103. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4 (2016). 
 104. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(2). 
 105. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,311 
(June 13, 2011). 
 106. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 107. For the purposes of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections and this Note generally, 
to retaliate includes to “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or 
in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 
 108. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)–(A)(i) (emphasis added) (noting that only “information” is 
required for protection, not original information). 
 109. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,304. 
 110. Id. 
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with [section 922]; . . . initiat[ed], testif[ied] in, or assist[ed] in any 
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the Commission based 
upon or related to such information; or [has made] disclosures that are 
required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”111 
Therefore, Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation protections apply to three classes 
of complaint:  “information provided to the SEC, involvement with an SEC 
investigation and disclosures that are protected under [the] Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002.”112  Ambiguity surrounding the final class—disclosures 
protected under Sarbanes-Oxley—has caused disagreement among circuit 
courts.  This disagreement is the focus of this Note.113 
As discussed above,114 the “disclosures that are protected under Sarbanes-
Oxley” include disclosures wherein an employee “provide[s] information” 
related to an SEC rule violation to “a Federal regulatory or law enforcement 
agency; any Member of Congress . . . ; or a person with supervisory authority 
over the employee (or other such person working for the employer who has 
the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).”115  By 
including these disclosures, Sarbanes-Oxley conceives of a wider class of 
whistleblowers than Dodd-Frank does.  Dodd-Frank references only “the 
Commission” anywhere it mentions a recipient of whistleblower information 
and, unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, does not directly acknowledge whistleblower 
reports to employers.116 
B.  The SEC’s Interpretation of Section 922 
By integrating Sarbanes-Oxley protections into Dodd-Frank, the 
legislature created an ambiguity.  Sarbanes-Oxley protects whistleblowers 
when they report to their supervisors—that is, not to the SEC.117  But to 
qualify as a whistleblower in the first place, Dodd-Frank requires that the 
individual report to the SEC.118  Faced with these conflicting provisions,119 
the SEC issued a rule to define whistleblower,120 pursuant to its authority 
 
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 
 112. R. Scott Oswald & David L. Scher, Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy Creates Circuit Split on 
Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Protections, WESTLAW J. EMP., Nov. 10, 2015, at 1, 2.  But see 
infra notes 203–04 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 115. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C) (emphasis added). 
 116. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (defining “whistleblower” as an individual who 
provides “information . . . to the Commission”); id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i) (prohibiting retaliation 
against an employee who “provid[es] information to the Commission”); id. § 78u-6(h)(2) 
(prohibiting the Commission from disclosing any information “provided by a whistleblower 
to the Commission”); id. § 78u-6(a)(3)(B) (requiring that the Commission not know 
“information” for that information to be “original”). 
 117. 18 U.S.C. § 1514(A)(a)(1)(C). 
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
 119. Compare id. § 78u-6(a)(6), with id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), and 18 U.S.C. § 
1514(A)(a)(1)(C). 
 120. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,304 
(June 13, 2011) (interpreting § 922(h)(1)(A)(iii) as providing antiretaliation protection when 
“employees report to . . . a person with supervisory authority over the employee or such other 
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under Dodd-Frank and the Securities Exchange Act.121  After undergoing 
notice and comment,122 the SEC clarified that because Dodd-Frank’s 
retaliation protections integrate Sarbanes-Oxley’s retaliation protections, 
Dodd-Frank must extend its protection to internal whistleblowers—those 
employees of public companies who report violations to their supervisor or 
“such other person working for the employer who has authority to 
investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct” as specified in Sarbanes-
Oxley.123  Unlike the aforementioned interpretation that section 
922(h)(1)(A)(i), (ii), and (iii) apply to three classes of complaint,124 the SEC 
interpreted them as applying to “three different categories of 
whistleblowers.”125  The third category “includes individuals who report to 
persons . . . other than the Commission.”126 
III.  COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 922 
The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, the SEC, and various scholars 
disagree as to whether section 922 only protects external whistleblowers who 
report to the SEC or whether it also protects internal whistleblowers who 
report to their supervisors.  The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits 
may soon issue opinions concurring either with the Second or the Fifth 
Circuit.127  Where the Second Circuit has recognized ambiguity within the 
statute and therefore deferred to the SEC’s more expansive interpretation,128 
the Fifth Circuit, finding no such ambiguity, has not deferred to the SEC and 
therefore has taken the narrower interpretation.129 
 
person working for the employer who has authority to investigate, discover, or terminate 
misconduct”). 
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (granting the Commission authority to “issue such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of [section 922] 
consistent with the purposes of [section 922]”). 
 122. See Proposed Rules for Implementing Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provisions, 75 
Fed. Reg. 70,488 (Nov. 17, 2010). 
 123. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,304. 
 124. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 125. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,304 
(emphasis added). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See infra note 131. 
 128. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 129. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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A.  The Courts That Find Ambiguity Defer to the SEC 
and Protect All Internal Whistleblowers 
The Second Circuit130 and a majority of district courts131 have deferred to 
the SEC’s interpretation132 and concluded that Dodd-Frank protects 
whistleblowers who report violations within their corporation.133  The 
Second Circuit’s decision is grounded in interpretive and policy 
justifications, but it faces significant challenges.  The Whistleblower 
Augmented Reward and Nonretaliation Act of 2016 is congruous with the 
Second Circuit’s decision.  Among other things, the act provides protection 
for all internal whistleblowers. 
1.  Why the Second Circuit Deferred to the SEC 
Courts will defer to an agency’s interpretation where the organic statute is 
ambiguous and the agency has been charged with making rules to interpret 
that ambiguity.134  The Second Circuit looked to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recent ruling in King v. Burwell135 to find this requisite ambiguity and defer 
to the SEC.136 
 
 130. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding the 
definition of “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank sufficiently ambiguous to “defer to the 
reasonable interpretive rule adopted by the appropriate agency”). 
 131. Kristin Goodchild, Securities/Administrative Law—Internal Reporters Who Blow the 
Whistle:  Are They Protected Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Anti-Retaliation Provision?, 38 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 23 n.155 (2016) (listing the courts that have heard the issue).  The Third 
Circuit is set to issue an opinion on the issue. See Danon v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., No. 15-6864, 
2016 WL 2988987 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-2881 (3d. Cir. June 22, 
2016).  However, because the lower court found that “issue preclusion forestall[ed] any 
analysis of whether Plaintiff’s activities were ‘protected’ under Dodd-Frank” it is uncertain 
whether the Third Circuit will address the issue. Id. at *5 n.5.  The Sixth Circuit recently had 
the opportunity to weigh in but dismissed the complaint instead because it did not allege 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Verble v. Morgan Stanley 
Smith Barney, LLC, No. 15-6397, 2017 WL 129040, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017).  However, 
the Sixth Circuit will have another opportunity to rule on the issue in Deykes v. Cooper-
Standard Automotive, Inc., No. 16-cv-11828, 2016 WL 6873395 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 22, 2016), 
appeal filed, No. 16-2740 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016).  The Seventh Circuit will also soon have 
the chance to weigh in. See Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., No. 14-C-352, 2016 WL 
4507317 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-3502 (7th Cir. Sept. 23, 2016).  In 
the Eleventh Circuit, a plaintiff has appealed his internal whistleblower claims after losing in 
the court below. Duke v. Prestige Cruises Int’l, Inc., No. 14-23017-CIV-KING, 2015 WL 
4886088 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2015), appeal filed, No. 16-15426, 2015 WL 4886088 (11th Cir. 
Aug. 11, 2016). 
 132. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,304 
(June 13, 2011). 
 133. Very recently, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion concurring with the Second Circuit 
and affirming the decision of the Northern District of California. See Somers v. Dig. Realty 
Tr., Inc., No. 15-17352, 2017 WL 908245 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017).  Instead of simply deferring 
to the SEC, the Ninth Circuit found that section 922 “unambiguously and expressly protects 
from retaliation all those who report to the SEC and who report internally.” Id. at *9.  However, 
the Court added that “even if the use of the word ‘whistleblower’ in the anti-retaliation 
provision creates uncertainty because of the earlier narrow definition of the term, the [SEC] 
has resolved any ambiguity and its regulation is entitled to deference.” Id. at *12. 
 134. See infra Part III.A.1.a. 
 135. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 136. See infra Part III.A.1.b. 
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To determine ambiguity courts look to a term’s context within a statute and 
the implications a distinct interpretation will have on the other parts of the 
statute.137  A court is more inclined to defer to an agency “whenever decision 
as to the meaning or reach of a statute [involves] reconciling conflicting 
policies.”138  This is especially so when the interpretation has “depended 
upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to 
agency regulations.”139  If the agency’s interpretation “represents a 
reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the 
agency’s care by the statute,” a court will not upend that interpretation unless 
“it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation 
is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.”140 
In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy,141 the Second Circuit addressed the tension 
between the whistleblower definition and whistleblower-protected acts in 
light of King.142  In King, the Supreme Court considered a provision in the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) that makes income tax subsidies available only 
to those who purchased health insurance on “an [e]xchange established by 
the State.”143  Ultimately, the Court determined that “the operation of the 
entire statute would be undermined” if such a limiting provision did not 
include subsidies for those who purchase health insurance on exchanges 
“established by the State or by the Federal Government.”144  In doing so, the 
Court implicitly added “or by the Federal Government” into the statute.145 
Even though the Court in King did not face a question of deference—
because the ACA did not implicitly delegate authority146—the Second 
Circuit still used King’s reasoning in Berman.147  In Berman, the Second 
Circuit recognized that within section 922 there is no “absolute conflict” 
 
 137. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081–82 (2015) (“[T]he plainness or 
ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, 
[but as well by] the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of 
the statute as a whole” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Robinson v. Shell 
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))).  Because “[a]mbiguity is a creature not of definitional 
possibilities but of statutory context,” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994), “[t]he 
meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed 
in context,” Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 
(2000).  Even when the question is not one of ambiguity or deference and a court has clear 
authority to interpret a statute’s language, “[i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory construction 
that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). 
 138. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)). 
 139. Id. (quoting Shimer, 367 U.S. at 382). 
 140. Id. at 845 (quoting Shimer, 367 U.S. at 383). 
 141. 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 142. Id. at 150. 
 143. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A), 
(c)(2)(A)(i) (2012)). 
 144. Berman, 801 F.3d at 150 (interpreting the King decision). 
 145. Id. 
 146. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89. 
 147. Berman, 801 F.3d at 150.  The Second Circuit even found that the issue in King was 
“far more problematic” than the issue faced in Berman. Id. (“In our case, . . . the issue is not 
whether [the] phrase means something other than what it literally says.”). 
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between the whistleblower definition’s Commission reporting requirement 
and the absence of such a requirement in the Sarbanes-Oxley integration in 
section 922(h)(1)(A)(iii).148  Tension remains, however, “between the 
[whistleblower] definition . . . and the limited protection provided by 
sub[section] (iii) . . . if it is subject to that definition.”149  Therefore, the 
Second Circuit held, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s holding in 
King, that there was at least sufficient ambiguity within section 922, in light 
of “the sharply limiting effect of a Commission reporting requirement,”150 to 
trigger Chevron deference to the SEC’s interpretation.151  The Second 
Circuit, with the majority of district courts,152 protects internal 
whistleblowers based on this deference. 
2.  Interpretive Merits of Internal Protection 
Part of the tension in Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection provisions 
stems from the fact that a Commission reporting requirement would render 
the third protected category—those who report wrongdoing to their 
supervisors—effectively moot.153  Subsection (iii), which integrates 
Sarbanes-Oxley, only provides protection above and beyond subsection (i) 
and (ii) for people who report violations internally.154  But those people 
would not constitute whistleblowers, because they have not reported the 
violation to the SEC.155  If subsection (iii) was not meant to bring internal 
 
 148. Id. at 150–51 (“Although the simultaneous employer/Commission reporting example 
avoids an absolute contradiction between the [provisions], a significant tension within [section 
922] nevertheless remains.”); see infra notes 207–11 and accompanying text (describing the 
Fifth Circuit’s competing interpretation in which the provisions are not deemed ambiguous, 
because a simultaneous reporting scenario avoids absolute contradiction). 
 149. Berman, 801 F.3d at 155. 
 150. Id. at 152. 
 151. Such an agency rule enjoys Chevron deference from the courts so long as the provision 
is ambiguous and the rule is a permissible interpretation of the provision. Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“If . . . Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue” and “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”).  As a threshold matter, Chevron deference is 
appropriate “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to 
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference 
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 
226–27 (2001).  Here, the SEC issued Rule 21F pursuant to an explicit authorization in 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2012) to “issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary or 
appropriate to implement the provisions of [section 922]” and with 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) 
granting general rulemaking authority to the SEC on all matters related to Securities 
Exchanges.  And, the SEC promulgated this legislative rule through notice-and-comment 
procedures. See Proposed Rules for Implementing Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provisions, 
75 Fed. Reg. 70,488 (Nov. 17, 2010).  So the SEC’s Rule 21F has the force of law and may 
qualify for deference under Chevron. 
 152. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 153 (naming the Northern District of California, Southern 
District of New York, District of New Jersey, District of Kansas, District of Massachusetts, 
District of Colorado, Middle District of Tennessee, and District of Connecticut as courts that 
defer). 
 153. Id. at 152. 
 154. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), with id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 155. See supra Part II.A. 
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whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank’s protection, a court would be unlikely to 
find a reason why Congress included it.156 
3.  Policy Benefits of Internal Protection 
Many scholars, going beyond statutory interpretation, advocate protecting 
internal whistleblowers on policy grounds.  The SEC’s decision to protect 
internal whistleblowers was aimed at motivating them to come forward 
without fear of retaliation so that the benefits of internal compliance 
mechanisms, as conceived by Sarbanes-Oxley, could be realized.157  In this, 
Dodd-Frank has been largely successful—internal reporting after its passage 
consistently set and surpassed “all-time highs.”158  Yet, a 2010 study of 
employee-whistleblowers showed that in 82 percent of cases, employees who 
reported violations were retaliated against—they either were terminated, quit 
under duress, or had significantly altered responsibilities.159  Additionally, 
whistleblowers’ fear of retaliation is not merely financial.  Internal 
whistleblowers also face the very real social threats of “ostracism, isolation, 
blacklisting, defamation, job stagnation, and personal consequences such as 
depression and family problems.”160  Perhaps unsurprisingly, “[w]hen 
 
 156. Courts will not interpret Congress as drafting meaningless provisions. Marx v. Gen. 
Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1177 (2013) (“[T]he canon against surplusage ‘assists only 
where a competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statute.’” 
(quoting Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 106 (2011))).  But see infra notes 
207–11 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s “simultaneous reporting” 
hypothetical that appears to give subsection (iii) meaning even with a Commission reporting 
requirement). 
 157. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,359 
(June 13, 2011). 
 158. See, e.g., Yin Wilczek, Employees’ Internal Fraud Reports Rise Even in Wake of SEC 
Whistleblower Program, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-8, A-9 (Apr. 10, 2012).  Ninety-seven 
percent of whistleblowers choose to report internally rather than externally in the first instance. 
ETHICS RES. CTR., INSIDE THE MIND OF A WHISTLEBLOWER:  A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE 
2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 13 (2012).  And, more than 80 percent of 
whistleblowers seeking bounties from the SEC have first reported internally. See Ben Protess 
& Nathaniel Popper, Hazy Future for Thriving S.E.C. Whistle-Blower Effort, N.Y. TIMES:  
DEALBOOK (Apr. 23, 2013, 9:04 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/hazy-future-
for-s-e-c-s-whistle-blower-office/ [https://perma.cc/WV5C-2YBN]; see also Orly Lobel, 
Lawyering Loyalties:  Speech Rights and Duties Within Twenty-First-Century New 
Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1250 (2009) (arguing that “internal protections are 
particularly crucial in view of research findings that . . . employees are more likely to choose 
internal reporting systems”). 
 159. Dyck et al., supra note 80, at 2216. 
 160. Norman D. Bishara et al., The Mouth of Truth, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 37, 97–98 
(2013); see also AUGUST B. MUNDEL, ETHICS IN QUALITY 132 (1991) (“Many [whistleblowers] 
find it extremely difficult to find new positions at equivalent levels giving rise to the view that 
influential people . . . have acted to blackball the individuals.”); Faqihi, supra note 51, at 3350 
(“Whistleblowers commonly fear . . . that they will have to ‘live their lives in misery, shunned 
by employers.’” (quoting Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection:  Invigorating 
Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. 
REV. 91, 124 (2007))); John Carreyrou, Theranos Whistleblower Shook the Company—And 
His Family, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2016, 11:17 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-
whistleblower-shook-the-companyand-his-family-1479335963 (telling the story of Theranos 
whistleblower Tyler Shultz and how his internal report caused the estrangement of his 
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employees perceive that they will be subject to retaliation for which they have 
no recourse in the courts, they are less likely to report to their supervisors any 
instances of wrongdoing.”161 
When internal whistleblowers are protected, corporations themselves stand 
to gain from the resulting increase in internal reporting.  Some scholars have 
argued that in a system highly protective of internal whistleblowers, 
corporations are better positioned to address compliance issues before they 
become serious or perhaps even before they grow into sanctionable 
offenses.162  Effective internal compliance mechanisms, as another scholar 
argues, provide companies with “enormous benefits.”163  These mechanisms 
better assure companies that they are adhering to the laws and regulations 
governing their actions; instill in employees a “culture of compliance”164 that 
combats any resistance, gaming, or self-interest that may otherwise control 
employee action;165 and may even diminish overall regulatory burdens.166 
When the SEC considered internal protections in Dodd-Frank, 
commenters emphasized the need to encourage internal whistleblowing.167  
They argued that this inclusion would enable corporations to avoid resource-
intensive litigation by discovering and resolving potential violations 
earlier.168  They also argued that corporations that are able to demonstrate an 
effective internal compliance program may receive mitigated penalties if held 
criminally liable for a securities violation.169 
Additionally, the SEC stands to gain significantly if whistleblowers can 
confidently report internally before subjecting the SEC to potentially 
frivolous tips.  Scholars and courts routinely point out that the tips reported 
to the SEC significantly improve in quality when internal reporting precedes 
external reporting.170  Upon releasing the SEC’s rule as to internal 
 
grandfather, former Secretary of State and Theranos board member George Schultz) [https:// 
perma.cc/3LQH-3TSJ]. 
 161. Pacella, supra note 99, at 756–57. 
 162. See Lauren J. Resnick et al., Anyone Can Whistle, 28 CORP. COUNS. 1, 1 (2013). 
 163. Pacella, supra note 99, at 760. 
 164. James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor:  A Reorientation in Compliance for 
Broker-Dealers, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1121, 1163. 
 165. Id. at 1160–62. 
 166. Pacella, supra note 99, at 760. 
 167. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,359 
(June 13, 2011). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Pacella, supra note 99, at 757. 
 170. See, e.g., Dressler v. Lime Energy, No. 14-CV-07060(FLW)(DEA), 2015 WL 
4773326, at *13 n.7 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2015) (“[I]nternal reporting prevents the SEC from 
receiving reports of mere misunderstandings . . . so that the Commission would receive fewer 
and higher quality reports . . . .  ‘[External only protection] encourages reports to the SEC that 
could be more efficiently handled internally, thus wasting government resources.’” (quoting 
Bussing v. Cor Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (D. Neb. 2014))); Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 
3d at 733 (“[internal reporting] will help vet the tips to the SEC, so that the SEC receives fewer 
and higher quality reports”); Caroline E. Keen, Note, Clarifying What Is “Clear”:  
Reconsidering Whistleblower Protections Under Dodd-Frank, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 215, 
234 (2015) (explaining that bypassing internal reporting would result in lower quality tips and 
could cause “significant waste of corporate and government resources”).  But see Dave 
Ebersole, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 OHIO 
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whistleblowers, then-SEC Chairwoman Mary L. Schapiro said that “[w]hile 
the SEC has a history of receiving a high volume of tips and complaints, the 
quality of the tips we have received has been better since Dodd-Frank became 
law.”171 
4.  Policy Challenges to Protecting 
All Internal Whistleblowers 
Protecting internal whistleblowers may be justified on certain policy 
grounds, but providing protection to all internal whistleblowers does, to a 
certain degree, prevent companies from controlling the compliance regimes 
that Sarbanes-Oxley requires.  Protecting all internal whistleblowers prevents 
a company from regulating its internal compliance department’s performance 
and threatens the quality of reports.172  For example, under an interpretation 
that protects all internal whistleblowers, an ineffective compliance officer 
who has failed to report a glaring securities violation to her supervisor may 
still receive protection when she finally does, albeit irresponsibly late, report 
the violation and is fired for doing so.173  Such a company may also find itself 
stifled by its inability to terminate a whistleblower even for legitimate, 
nonretaliatory reasons.  Such reasons may include employee redundancy, the 
need to close particular plants or offices, or because the whistleblower’s job 
performance is below expectation.174 
Furthermore, “overprotection may encourage bad-faith reporting and 
exaggerated, or even false, accusations” for those employees who fear job 
loss for other, unrelated reasons.175  Some scholars believe that 
 
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 127 (2011) (expressing doubt as to whether increased 
quality will accompany expanded protection); Andrew Walker, Note, Why Shouldn’t We 
Protect Internal Whistleblowers?:  Exploring Justifications for the Asadi Decision, 90 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1761, 1772 (2015) (finding “a bit too optimistic” the idea that internal whistleblowing 
protection will “increase the quality of information that the SEC receives”). 
 171. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May 25, 
2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm [https://perma.cc/535Z-UG4G]. 
 172. Robert M. Bowen et al., Whistle-Blowing:  Target Firm Characteristics and Economic 
Consequences, 85 ACCT. REV. 1239, 1240 (2010) (“[S]keptics argue that . . . ineffective 
workers misuse their protected ‘whistle-blower’ status to avoid discharges or disciplinary 
proceedings.”). 
 173. Matthias Schmidt, “Whistle Blowing” Regulation and Accounting Standards 
Enforcement in Germany and Europe—An Economic Perspective, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
143, 158 (2005) (“Protection from retaliation could be utilized by employees to fend off 
legitimate criticism or disciplinary measures since they are principally able to claim the status 
of a whistle blower.”). 
 174. LIPMAN, supra note 33, at 132. 
 175. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix:  The Comparative Effectiveness 
of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 
1177 (2010); see also LIPMAN, supra note 33, at 5 (noting that some employees, “in an attempt 
to manipulate the system,” blow the whistle on legal company activities “when they believe 
that their employment is about to be terminated”); W. Michael Hoffman & Robert E. McNulty, 
A Business Ethics Theory of Whistleblowing:  Responding to the $1 Trillion Question, in 
WHISTLEBLOWING:  IN DEFENSE OF PROPER ACTION 45, 53 (Marek Arszulowicz & Wojciech 
W. Gasparski eds., 2011) (“[W]histleblowing is sometimes done out of vengeance.”); 
Ebersole, supra note 170, at 145 n.179 (noting that section 922(a) “only requires that an 
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“troublemakers could potentially misuse their whistle-blower status to avoid 
being suspended or dismissed from employment.”176  Because of “the 
enormous trouble that can result from disciplining a whistle-blower, 
supervisors and managers might find it easier to tolerate an unproductive and 
ineffective employee rather than dismiss or demote the employee.”177  
Therefore, even when “rewards are not provided,” as for Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblowers, “controlling for such retaliation might nonetheless induce 
opportunistic behavior.”178  Dodd-Frank, which does provide whistleblowing 
rewards, may be at an even greater risk of inducing such opportunism. 
If whistleblower protections were limited only to those who report 
externally, a company could avoid enforcement costs by encouraging 
effective internal reporting mechanisms, thereby minimizing the number of 
external reports.179  Because 97 percent of whistleblowers choose to report 
internally rather than externally in the first instance,180 protecting all internal 
whistleblowers could significantly decrease corporate efficiency because 
companies would be forced to retain inefficient employees.  This would be 
especially true for the internal compliance departments Sarbanes-Oxley 
depends on to facilitate institutional compliance.181 
5.  The WARN Act:  A Proposed Codification 
of Internal Protection 
Currently before Congress is the Whistleblower Augmented Reward and 
Nonretaliation Act of 2016 (“the WARN Act”).182  Introduced February 25, 
2016, by Representative Elijah Cummings, the WARN Act proposes a 
federal solution to the present circuit split by, among other things, legislating 
the SEC’s interpretation of section 922 and protecting all internal 
whistleblowers.183  In doing so, however, this bill threatens to further 
complicate Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections. 
 
employee report information, not that the employee report accurate information, to obtain 
whistleblower protection”). 
 176. Bowen et al., supra note 172, at 1244 (citing a 1996 study by Frank Anechiarico and 
James B. Jacobs that found “several municipal employees in New York City chose to blow 
the whistle in order to fall under state protection as a pre-emptive measure to being fired”). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Schmidt, supra note 173, at 158. 
 179. For a holistic analysis on what causes a whistleblower to report externally instead of 
internally, see generally Bishara et al., supra note 160. 
 180. See ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 158, at 13. 
 181. Vogt, supra note 40, at 375–76 (“Internal reporting and compliance programs are at 
the heart of Sarbanes-Oxley . . . .  In [its] wake . . . companies expended considerable time and 
effort to set up strong internal compliance programs in order to encourage employees to report 
violations internally.”); see also Shannon Kay Quigley, Comment, Whistleblower Tug-of-
War:  Corporate Attempts to Secure Internal Reporting Procedures in the Face of External 
Monetary Incentives Provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 264–65 
(2012); Walker, supra note 170, at 1780 (“If businesses do respond to [an external reporting 
requirement] by taking stronger ex ante measures to prevent wrongdoing, such measures will 
not only prevent undesirable external whistleblowing but will also ensure that socially 
destructive wrongdoing never occurs in the first instance.”). 
 182. See S. 2591, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 4619, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 183. See H.R. 4619. 
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The WARN Act begins by removing the entire definition of 
“whistleblower” from section 922(a)(6).184  It does this despite the fact that 
merely striking the words “to the Commission” from the original definition 
likely would be sufficient to institute the SEC’s interpretation.185  The 
WARN Act then removes the word “whistleblower” from Dodd-Frank’s 
retaliation protection provisions.186  Instead, where Dodd-Frank simply uses 
the term “whistleblower,” WARN replaces the term with a general 
description of the classes of individuals that might become 
whistleblowers.187  For example, section 4(c)(1) of the WARN Act strikes 
“any lawful act done by the whistleblower” and inserts: 
any lawful act done by the applicant, employee, or former employee or 
perceived to have been done by the applicant, employee, or former 
employee (or any person acting pursuant to the request of the applicant, 
employee, or former employee), whether at the initiative of the applicant, 
employee, or former employee or in the ordinary course of the duties of the 
applicant, employee, or former employee. 
The WARN Act also supplements Dodd-Frank section 922(h)(1)(a)’s 
subsections (i), (ii), and (iii) by creating two more protected classes of 
whistleblower actions.  The first is a protection for an applicant, employee, 
former employee, or “other such person”—whether whistleblower or not—
who objects or refuses to participate in an act reasonably believed to be a 
violation of an SEC law, rule, order, or policy.188  The second is a statutory 
protection for internal whistleblowing when reported by an applicant, 
employee, former employee, or “other such person.”189 
The WARN Act fails to account for the detrimental effects of protecting 
all internal whistleblowers, as discussed above.190  Additionally, it creates 
internal inconsistencies.  For example, section 922’s subsection (iii), which 
integrates Sarbanes-Oxley, appears unnecessary with the addition of 
WARN’s proposed subsections (iv) and (v).  Furthermore, it is not entirely 
clear what meaning “other such person” adds to the already included 
categories of applicants, employees, and former employees.191  Because of 
 
 184. Id. § 4(a). 
 185. See id. § 4(c).  The phrase “to the Commission” alone causes the tension with 
subsection (iii) that gives rise to the circuit split. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying 
text.  Striking “to the Commission” would make Dodd-Frank’s definition of whistleblower 
read, “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws 
in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”  Because the SEC has 
issued a rule clarifying that reports can be made internally, internal whistleblowers could be 
protected merely by striking “to the Commission” from the definition. See supra Part II.B. 
 186. The WARN Act also could have protected internal whistleblowers by striking only 
the definition of whistleblower but leaving the term throughout Dodd-Frank.  Because the term 
would have been left undefined, it likely would have been up to the SEC to fill the gap. See 
generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 
U.S. 218 (1994). 
 187. See, e.g., H.R. 4619 §§ 4(c)(1), (c)(4), 5(c)(1). 
 188. Id. § 4(c)(1)(4)(iv) (proposing a section 922(h)(1)(a)(iv) to Dodd-Frank). 
 189. Id. § 4(c)(4) (proposing a section 922(h)(1)(a)(v) to Dodd-Frank). 
 190. See supra Part III.A.4. 
 191. See supra note 156. 
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its confusing structure and its inability to solve the problems created by 
blanket internal whistleblower protection, the WARN Act is inadequate as a 
legislative solution to this issue. 
B.  Courts That Find No Ambiguity 
Protect No Internal Whistleblowers 
The Fifth Circuit192 and a minority of district courts193 have concluded that 
Dodd-Frank only protects whistleblowers who report securities law 
violations directly to the SEC.  While this interpretation finds support both 
in text and policy, it also faces significant challenges. 
1.  Why the Fifth Circuit Did Not Defer to the SEC 
For the Fifth Circuit and courts following its interpretation, Dodd-Frank’s 
explicit whistleblower definition in section 922(a)(6) marks the critical 
foundation for—if not the end of—the requisite analysis.194  In Asadi v. G.E. 
Energy (USA), L.L.C.,195 the Fifth Circuit confidently declared that any 
“perceived conflict between [the whistleblower definition] and [the 
whistleblower protections] rests on a misreading of the operative provisions 
of [section 922].”196  It determined that the definition of the term 
whistleblower,197 “standing alone, expressly and unambiguously requires 
that an individual provide information to the SEC to qualify as a 
‘whistleblower’” under the whistleblower protection provision.198 
Neither of the parties contested this interpretation, nor did Asadi claim to 
qualify as a whistleblower under section 922(a)(6).199  Asadi did argue, in 
line with the interpretation described above,200 that section 922(h)(1)(A)(iii) 
conflicts with this definition because “an individual can take actions falling 
 
 192. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
Dodd-Frank unambiguously “requires individuals to provide information . . . to the SEC” to 
qualify as a whistleblower and thereby “qualify for protection”). 
 193. Goodchild, supra note 131, at 18 n.109 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Verble v. Morgan 
Stanley Smith Barney, L.L.C., 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 656 (E.D. Tenn. 2015), aff’d on other 
grounds, No. 15-6397, 2017 WL 129040 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017), cert. denied, No. 16-946, 
2017 WL 434012 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2017); Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 
640, 646 (E.D. Wis. 2014); Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 
WL 2619501, at *7–8 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014); Banko v. Apple, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 
756 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 
3786643, at *1, *6 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 571 F. App’x 698 (10th 
Cir. 2014). 
 194. The Asadi decision first stated the rule that “[i]f the statutory text is unambiguous, our 
inquiry begins and ends with the text.” Asadi, 720 F.3d at 622 (citing BedRoc Ltd. v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)).  The court then held, “We start and end our analysis with 
the text.” Id. at 623. 
 195. 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 196. Id. at 624–25. 
 197. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012). 
 198. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623. 
 199. Id. at 624. 
 200. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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within this category and, if he does not report information to the SEC, fail to 
qualify as a ‘whistleblower’ under [section 922(h)(1)(A)(iii)].”201 
The court, however, refused to find ambiguity in the statute.  It interpreted 
section 922(a)(6) as the only definition of “whistleblower”202 and stated that 
conflict would exist “only if we read the three categories of protected activity 
as additional definitions of three types of whistleblowers.”203  Instead, it read 
section 922(a)(6) as an answer to the question, “Who is protected?”  In 
contrast, it read sections 922(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) as answering the slightly 
different question, “What actions by protected individuals constitute 
protected activity?”204 
The Fifth Circuit bolstered this interpretation with an appeal to the rule 
against surplusage.  It reasoned that extending protection to a whistleblower 
who does not report “to the Commission” would read that phrase out of the 
statute.205  The Fifth Circuit then went even further, saying that if the statute 
were ambiguous, the court would not be inclined to interpret that ambiguity 
in a way that creates such obvious surplusage.206 
Finally, the court also presented a hypothetical situation in which 
subsection (iii) would add to the whistleblower protections even while 
remaining limited to the Commission reporting requirement in the 
whistleblower definition.  The court reasoned that without subsection (iii), a 
whistleblower who is fired after reporting simultaneously to her supervisor 
and to the SEC may be without protection.207  For example, if a supervisor 
never knew about an employee’s SEC report, the supervisor could not have 
retaliated against the employee “because of” the lawful act done “in 
providing information to the Commission” under subsection (i).208  Rather, 
such a supervisor would be retaliating based on the internal report but would 
be doing so against an employee who also made an external report.209  The 
court reasoned that subsection (iii)’s Sarbanes-Oxley integration protects the 
internal whistleblower who also qualifies as a definitional whistleblower by 
“provid[ing] . . . information . . . to the Commission.”210  Therefore, Congress 
may have included subsection (iii) to protect whistleblowers in the case of 
simultaneous reporting.211 
 
 201. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626. 
 202. Id. at 623 (“When . . . a definitional section says that a word ‘means’ something, the 
clear import is that this is its only meaning.” (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 226 (2012))). 
 203. Id. at 626. 
 204. See id. at 625. 
 205. Id. at 628. 
 206. Id. (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the 
whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be 
superfluous, void, or insignificant.” (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001))). 
 207. Id. at 627–28. 
 208. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012); see also supra Part II.A. 
 209. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627–28. 
 210. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
 211. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627–28. 
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2.  Interpretive Merits of External-Only Protection 
Looking to the rest of Dodd-Frank rules out the possibility that failing to 
include explicit internal whistleblower protections was due to congressional 
error.  If Dodd-Frank only contained one provision related to whistleblowers, 
some may defer to the SEC on the grounds that Congress failed to explicitly 
protect internal whistleblowers only as an oversight.212  Indeed, the 
integration of Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protection was a last-minute 
addition to Dodd-Frank that came out of the final conference without any 
record of discussion on the issue.213  This reasoning served as one of the 
justifications used by the Northern District of California in finding that 
“given the belated addition of subsection (iii), it is at least reasonable to 
assume that Congress intended for the scope of [Dodd-Frank’s] 
whistleblower-provisions to be broader than in earlier versions of the bill.”214 
However, taking a wider view of Dodd-Frank215 actually bolsters the 
narrower Asadi interpretation.  There are two other provisions in the statute 
that relate to protecting whistleblowers:  commodities whistleblowers in 
section 748216 and whistleblowers who provide information related to 
consumer financial protection in section 1057.217 
 
 212. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, L.L.C., 801 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2015) (“When conferees 
are hastily trying to reconcile House and Senate bills, each of which number hundreds of 
pages, and someone succeeds in inserting a new provision like [this one], it is not at all 
surprising that no one noticed that the new sub[section] and the definition of ‘whistleblower’ 
do not fit together neatly.”); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1103 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015) (suggesting that the “newly-added (and very broad) subsection (iii) and the narrow 
whistleblower definition that was consistently present in every version of the bill from its first 
introduction in Congress . . . could well have been a legislative oversight”); Ebersole, supra 
note 170, at 127 (positing that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions may have been “lost” 
in the “2000 pages” of legislation).  But see SKEEL, supra note 20, at 4 (noting Dodd-Frank’s 
page length is “[a] mere 800 or so when the margins and spacing have been squeezed”); Zach 
Deloy, Note, Whistle While You Work:  Whistle-Blower Protection Under Dodd-Frank, 62 
WAYNE L. REV. 107, 110 (2016) (characterizing Dodd-Frank’s drafting as “fastidious” and its 
“language pertaining to whistle-blowers” as “extremely detailed”). 
 213. Compare H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 922(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (as passed by Senate, May 
20, 2010), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).  However, a good statute interpreter is 
careful not to read too much into even a complete dearth of preenactment legislative 
discussion. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We are 
here to apply the statute, not legislative history, and certainly not the absence of legislative 
history.  Statutes are the law though sleeping dogs lie.”). 
 214. Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1103. 
 215. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94–95 (1993) 
(“[W]e examine first the language of the governing statute, guided not by ‘a single sentence 
or member of a sentence, but look[ing] to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object 
and policy.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 
51 (1987))).  Looking at an entire law to gain clarity on a particular provision is not new. See 
United States v. Boisdoré’s Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850) (“In expounding a statute, we must 
not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the 
whole law, and to its object and policy.”). 
 216. 7 U.S.C. § 26. 
 217. 12 U.S.C. § 5567. 
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The first of these two provides little assistance here because section 748 
copies section 922’s language almost word for word.218  The two are nearly 
identical except section 748 replaces the SEC with the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission219 (CFTC) and does not include a third protected 
category akin to section 922’s Sarbanes-Oxley integration.220  Most 
importantly, though, it omits the confounding provision. 
The second whistleblower provision is more illuminating.  Under Title X 
of Dodd-Frank, Congress passed the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 
2010.221  This act created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
(CFPB), which, as its name implies, is responsible for regulating “the 
offering and provision of consumer financial products or services.”222  In the 
effort to accomplish this goal, the CFPB provides whistleblower protection 
by prohibiting any person covered by consumer financial laws from 
terminating or discriminating against an employee who has 
“provided . . . information to the employer, the Bureau, or any other State, 
local, or Federal, government authority or law enforcement agency relating 
to any violation of . . . any rule, order, standard, or prohibition prescribed by 
the Bureau.”223 
To find that Dodd-Frank implicitly provides internal whistleblower 
protection in Title IX (section 922) after it explicitly provided the same 
protection in Title X would violate a core tenant of statutory interpretation, 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.224  In other words, if Congress had not 
made its intention sufficiently clear when it repeated external-only language 
in the CFTC provision, the CFPB provision made it crystal clear that if 
 
 218. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).  
Obviously, section 922 follows after the “Commodity whistleblower incentives and 
protection” language in section 748, but, for the purposes of this Note, it is unimportant which 
was drafted first and which copied from the other.  If the Sarbanes-Oxley integration had been 
used even in the earliest versions of Dodd-Frank—which did not include a correlative 
commodities whistleblower protection—courts would still face the issue currently under 
discussion. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7203(g)(1)(A) (as introduced in House, Dec. 2, 
2009) (tying whistleblower protection to information provided “to the Commission”).  
Interestingly, the only other relevant way in which securities and commodities whistleblower 
protections differ in Dodd-Frank is that securities whistleblowers are afforded protection for 
“initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or administrative action 
of the [SEC].” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added).  Commodities 
whistleblowers, on the other hand, are only afforded protection for “assisting in any 
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the [Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission].” 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (emphases added).  One is led to wonder how a 
court will handle the first commodities whistleblower who suffers a retaliatory firing after 
initiating or testifying in a CFTC investigation but who does not otherwise assist in that 
investigation. See supra note 212 (describing the “fastidious” way in which Dodd-Frank was 
drafted). 
 219. 12 U.S.C. § 5301(5). 
 220. See 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 221. Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955 (2010). 
 222. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). 
 223. Id. § 5567(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 224. See Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2390 (2014) (“[W]hen ‘Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another[,]’ . . . this Court 
‘presume[s]’ that Congress intended a difference in meaning.”  (fourth alteration in original) 
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). 
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Congress had wished to include internal whistleblowers, it knew how to do 
so.225 
3.  Interpretive Challenges to Protecting 
Only External Whistleblowers 
Pragmatically speaking, the Fifth Circuit’s textual interpretation also may 
be flawed.  The court reasoned that subsection (iii) adds additional protection 
to section 922 in the anomalous situation where a whistleblower has reported 
to the SEC and reported internally.226  If the whistleblower’s supervisor has 
no knowledge of the SEC report and fires the whistleblower for the internal 
report, the whistleblower still meets section 922(a)(6)’s definition of a 
whistleblower (someone who reports to the SEC) and is protected under 
subsection (iii)’s Sarbanes-Oxley integration (having been fired for reporting 
a violation to a supervisor).227  On such a reading, without subsection (iii), 
this whistleblower may not have been protected because the supervisor, not 
privy to the SEC report, could not have fired the whistleblower because of 
the SEC report.228 
However, this hypothetical ignores critical whistleblower realities that 
render it all but impossible.  Those who choose to report internally usually 
do so because they know and trust their direct supervisors.229  Alternatively, 
employees choose to report externally if “the overall culture or the ethics of 
their top managers or supervisors is perceived to be weak”—that is, if they 
do not know and trust their direct supervisors.230  Whistleblowers are also 
inclined to report externally as the severity of the violation increases.231 
These practicalities of whistleblower decision making make it unlikely that 
a whistleblower would choose to report externally (motivated in part by 
distrust in her supervisor) before then reporting internally to a supervisor.232  
Similarly, if the severity of the violation motivates the whistleblower to 
report externally, it is unlikely she would take the drastic step of reporting 
externally, then “take the less drastic step of reporting internally.”233 
Furthermore, according to a 2011 survey, only 3 percent of whistleblower 
reports are made externally rather than internally.234  Necessarily, an even 
 
 225. The CFTC has used this very whistleblowing protection to grant whistleblower awards 
in excess of $10 million. Bryan B. House et al., Review of Recent Whistleblower 
Developments:  SEC, CFTC, Amicus Brief, Verble v. Morgan Stanley, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 
12, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/review-recent-whistleblower-developments-
sec-cftc-amicus-brief-verble-v-morgan [https://perma.cc/VUB2-AZ4H]. 
 226. See supra notes 207–11 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra notes 207–11 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 207–11 and accompanying text. 
 229. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 158, at 11. 
 230. Id. at 13. 
 231. Id. at 14. 
 232. Vogt, supra note 40, at 368–69; see also Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, 801 F.3d 145, 151 
(2d Cir. 2015) (“[A]lthough there may be some potential whistleblowers who will report 
wrongdoing simultaneously to their employer and the Commission, they are likely to be few 
in number.”). 
 233. Vogt, supra note 40, at 369. 
 234. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 158, at 13. 
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smaller percentage are made internally after being made externally.  
Therefore, the reading proposed by the court in Asadi interprets Congress as 
adopting all of Sarbanes-Oxley’s protections to protect the fewer than 3 
percent of whistleblowers who make internal reports after making external 
reports.235  Because a Commission reporting requirement would effectively 
reduce subsection (iii)’s robust Sarbanes-Oxley integration to a protection 
used only in an exceptionally rare circumstance,236 it is “doubtful” that 
Congress expected subsection (iii) to have such an “extremely limited 
scope.”237  Because of this ambiguity, the Fifth Circuit may have been 
mistaken in not relying on the SEC’s reasonable interpretation.238 
4.  Policy Challenges to Protecting 
Only External Whistleblowers 
An interpretation that protects only external whistleblowers would result 
in increased cost for the SEC and impossible requirements of corporate 
counsel. 
a.  Protecting Only External Whistleblowers 
Would Be More Expensive for the SEC 
Scholars recognize that protecting only external whistleblowers, even if 
correct as a matter of statutory interpretation, will result in increased reports 
to the SEC and decreased internal reports.239  Some have posited that 
increased SEC reporting would swell the SEC’s coffers due to an increase in 
the total number of fines collected.240  This conclusion is a natural result of 
the presumption that “[i]nternal whistleblowing protects organizational 
interests at the expense of the public treasury.”241  Relatedly, others have 
argued that in circumstances where the need for external enforcement persists 
even after the illegal conduct has ended, an internal reporting model would 
 
 235. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 152 (“In light of these realities . . . the question becomes 
whether Congress intended to add sub[section] (iii) to subsection [922](h)(1)(A) only to 
achieve such a limited result.”). 
 236. Id. (“[A]part from the rare example of simultaneous (or nearly simultaneous) reporting 
of wrongdoing to an employer and to the Commission, there would be virtually no situation 
where an SEC reporting requirement would leave sub[section] (iii) with any scope.”). 
 237. Id. at 155. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Pacella, supra note 99, at 725; Deloy, supra note 212, at 116 (arguing that external-
only protection may cause “increase[d] reporting to the SEC” while “internal reporting would 
be greatly reduced”); Heidi L. Hansberry, Comment, In Spite of Its Good Intentions, the Dodd-
Frank Act Has Created an FCPA Monster, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195, 206 (2012) 
(arguing that Dodd-Frank’s “[s]tronger whistleblower protections and incentives will likely 
cause an increase in . . . reporting”); Keen, supra note 170, at 234 (noting the “greater number 
of disclosures” to the SEC in an system where employees “bypass[] internal reporting”). 
 240. Walker, supra note 170, at 1778. 
 241. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich:  
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 335 
(1992) (emphasis added). 
2870 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
insulate companies from their acts’ negative externalities at the expense of 
the public at large.242 
However, such an understanding ignores the fact that if compliance is the 
goal, requiring ex post enforcement is necessarily more expensive than ex 
ante compliance.243  As the SEC itself has made clear, the internal 
whistleblower protection in Rule 21F was at least partly motivated by a 
concern that “the Commission will ‘incur costs to process and validate’ 
whistleblower ‘tips of varying quality’ if companies are not allowed ‘to 
investigate and respond to potential securities laws violations prior to 
reporting them to the Commission.’”244  Internal reporting “help[s] vet the 
tips to the SEC, so that the SEC receives fewer and higher quality reports 
from whistleblowers.”245  For this reason, an external-only protection model 
“is over-inclusive, as it encourages reports to the SEC that could be more 
efficiently handled internally.”246  Directing all such reports to the SEC 
threatens to “wast[e] government resources generally and divert[] resources 
from cases that need the SEC’s full attention.”247 
The SEC’s goal under Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank is to shrink the 
need for enforcement actions in the first place by creating sufficient 
disincentives for noncompliance and effectively instilling a culture of 
compliance within corporations and among employees.248  The purpose of 
the SEC’s enforcement should not be to support a complex regulatory 
ecosystem that diverts corporate earnings to better monitor corporations.  By 
giving whistleblowers protection and awarding them bounties when they do 
not report internally, the external-only model threatens to increase total cost.  
Employees may be incentivized to sit on a fraudulent scheme and only report 
to the SEC when it has grown large enough to warrant a bounty.249  The same 
employee in a model that protects internal whistleblowing would be 
incentivized from internally reporting the fraud the moment it is detected.  In 
theory, this would prevent the fraud from growing and thus preempt the need 
for enforcement action by the SEC.250 
 
 242. See Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws:  Defending a More 
Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1656 (2008) 
(explaining that in circumstances where the damage caused by a violation is ongoing, as in 
environmental regulations, behavior change resulting from an internal report may result in 
underenforcement). 
 243. See Bishara et al., supra note 160, at 76. 
 244. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting 
Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488, 70,516 (Nov. 17, 2010)); see also 
Lobel, supra note 158, at 1250 (arguing “internal protections are particularly crucial in view 
of research findings that . . . employees are more likely to choose internal reporting systems”). 
 245. Bussing v. Cor Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (D. Neb. 2014) (“[Internal 
reporting] allows companies to remedy improper conduct at an early stage, perhaps before it 
rises to the level of a violation.”). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Pacella, supra note 99, at 760. 
 249. See Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733; Ebersole, supra note 170, at 153–54. 
 250. Stephanie Klein, Comment, Interpreting the Definition of a Whistleblower Under 
Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation Provision:  How and Why Public Policy Should Guide the 
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b.  Protecting Only External Whistleblowers 
Forces Corporate Counsel to Act Irrationally 
A broad interpretation of section 922 may, at worst, diminish a company’s 
discretion over its own compliance officers and internal auditors.251  
However, a narrow interpretation creates a situation in which corporate 
counsel cannot rationally comply with both Dodd-Frank and the other SEC 
provisions specifically regulating securities companies’ attorneys. 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress explicitly required in-house counsel to 
disclose illegal activity internally.  In section 307, Sarbanes-Oxley requires 
all attorneys “appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way” 
to “report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of 
fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company . . . to the chief legal 
counsel or the chief executive officer of the company.”252  If the chief legal 
counsel or executive officer then fails to adopt “appropriate remedial 
measures,” the attorney may report directly to a compliance committee of the 
board of directors.253  If the attorney suffers discharge, demotion, suspension, 
threat, harassment, or discrimination because of her report, section 806 
provides protection and affords the attorney the right to back pay, with 
interest, special damages, and reinstatement at the same seniority status that 
she would have had, but for the discrimination.254 
In addition to this congressional requirement that attorneys report 
violations to their own companies, the SEC has requirements for when 
attorneys are permitted to report violations to the SEC.  The SEC 
promulgated 17 C.F.R. § 205 (“Rule 205”) pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley.255  
Rule 205 permits in-house counsel to report certain confidential information 
to the SEC in violation of the traditional attorney-client privilege.256  
However, under Rule 205, the attorney must first report to the corporation’s 
chief counsel, who must “in turn report up the corporate ladder.”257  Then, 
only if such internal mechanisms fail to produce compliance, the attorney 
may report confidential information to the SEC.258  This general protocol is 
often referred to as an “up, then out” reporting procedure.259 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC’s rules promulgated thereunder, 
corporate counsel is obligated to report “up, then out” and only by reporting 
 
Courts in Finding That Whistleblowers Do Not Need to Report to the SEC, 10 FLA. INT’L U. 
L. REV. 279, 315 (2014) (concluding that an internal protection model allows companies to 
“remedy violations . . . before they become a larger problem”). 
 251. See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
 252. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012). 
 253. Id. 
 254. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2). 
 255. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2016). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Faqihi, supra note 51, at 3378.  For general information on attorney reporting 
requirements, see LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, ATTORNEYS AS SEC WHISTLEBLOWERS:  CAN AN 
ATTORNEY BLOW THE WHISTLE ON A CLIENT AND GET A MONETARY AWARD? (2013), 
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/SEC-whistleblowers [https://perma.cc/8CL6-M8QN]. 
 258. Faqihi, supra note 51, at 3378. 
 259. Id. at 3390. 
2872 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
in this way will the attorney receive protection against retaliatory firing.260  
However, with external-only protection under Dodd-Frank, attorneys acting 
in compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley and Rule 205 may be without recourse 
under the Dodd-Frank Act.261 
C.  Dodd-Frank and Related Statues Protect, 
but Distinguish, Internal Whistleblowers 
For the purposes of retaliation protection, the Second and Fifth Circuit 
Courts and the WARN Act only distinguish whistleblowers based on whether 
their report is internal or external.  Other systems within the SEC also 
distinguish between whistleblowers on these grounds.  However, SEC rules 
and related whistleblower protection regimes go one step further to 
distinguish between different types of internal whistleblowers. 
1.  Related Whistleblower Regimes 
Whistleblower protections in closely related corporate regulations, such as 
the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, Dodd-Frank’s Consumer 
Financial Protection Act, and Sarbanes-Oxley, may shed light on better 
solutions to Dodd-Frank’s internal-external whistleblower conundrum. 
a.  The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act 
Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act262 (“the 
Stimulus”) alongside Dodd-Frank in response to the 2008 financial crisis.263  
The Stimulus was passed to provide funds for state and local governments in 
an effort to stimulate the economy and mitigate the damage done by the 
recession on a localized level.264  Like Dodd-Frank, it contains broad 
whistleblower protections.265  However, in less uncertain terms than Dodd-
Frank, the Stimulus provides whistleblower protection for any nonfederal 
employees of employers “receiv[ing] stimulus funds”266 who make a 
protected disclosure to a variety of state and federal enforcement and 
regulatory agents or “a person with supervisory authority over the employee 
(or such other person working for the employer who has the authority to 
investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).”267  This language is, 
 
 260. See id. at 3380 n.401 (“Under [Sarbanes-Oxley] and Part 205, attorneys are first 
required to report misconduct internally, whereas the Fifth Circuit ruling requires attorneys to 
report to the SEC in order to be afforded whistleblower protection under Dodd-Frank.”). 
 261. Id. at 3380–81; see also Keen, supra note 170, at 230 (“It does not make sense that 
Congress and the SEC would intend to incentivize reporting yet leave employees in situations 
where ‘individuals who take socially-desirous actions fail to be granted protection.’” (quoting 
Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 757 (N.D. Cal. 2013))). 
 262. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 263. VAUGHN, supra note 37, at 155–56. 
 264. Id. 
 265. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 1553, 123 Stat. at 297. 
 266. VAUGHN, supra note 37, at 156.  This includes employees of organizations that receive 
the stimulus funds, are paid by the stimulus funds, and state and local governments. Id. 
 267. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 1553, 123 Stat. at 297. 
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perhaps not surprisingly, identical to the language used in Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
whistleblower protection statute.268  Applying the Stimulus’s structure to the 
present issue would suggest the SEC should protect internal whistleblowers 
under Dodd-Frank. 
b.  The Consumer Financial Protection Act 
While the Stimulus was not part of Dodd-Frank, Dodd-Frank provides 
other potentially informative whistleblower protections outside section 922.  
Interestingly, the “longest lasting legacy” of Dodd-Frank may not be its many 
complex regulations of banks and securities companies but rather its 
establishment of the CFPB.269  In creating the CFPB, Dodd-Frank afforded 
the bureau its own whistleblower protections.270  These include protections 
for employees who report potential violations to the CFPB or to their 
employer.271 
As discussed above, the explicit protections for internal whistleblowers in 
the CFPB provisions likely weigh against an interpretation that reads similar 
implicit provisions into the SEC’s protections.272  However, the same CFPB 
whistleblower provisions may suggest how to more effectively craft a better 
rule on section 922.  Alternatively, it may suggest to courts how to interpret 
section 922, or it may instruct Congress on how to effectively craft a revised 
version of section 922.  Because the CFPB provides general protection for 
internal whistleblowers, if the SEC applies the CFPB’s whistleblower 
structure to the present issue, it should similarly protect internal 
whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank. 
c.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
This Note has made clear that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections 
integrate Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protections and, in doing so, have 
caused much confusion about internal and external whistleblowers under 
Dodd-Frank.  However, this explicit interconnection between the two acts 
gives the SEC and lawmakers all the more reason to look to Sarbanes-Oxley 
as they search for an effective way to delineate between and among external 
and internal whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank.  As described above, 
Sarbanes-Oxley mandates and incentivizes companies to establish and 
maintain internal monitoring controls.273  These controls include establishing 
internal whistleblowing channels274 and protecting internal whistleblowers 
 
 268. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2012) (“[W]hen the information or assistance is 
provided to . . . a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person 
working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate 
misconduct) . . . .”). 
 269. Eric J. Mogilnicki & Melissa S. Malpass, The First Year of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau:  An Overview, 68 BUS. LAW. 557, 557 (2013). 
 270. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra Part III.A.4. 
 274. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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against retaliation.275  Even if Sarbanes-Oxley confuses Dodd-Frank as an 
interpretive matter, it may inform Dodd-Frank as a matter of policy.  
Sarbanes-Oxley provides protection for internal whistleblowers, and, as a 
policy prescription, it would encourage Dodd-Frank to do the same. 
Importantly, in looking at all the other federal whistleblower protections 
within the U.S. Code, neither the Second Circuit’s interpretation, protecting 
all internal whistleblowers, nor the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, protecting 
only external whistleblowers, holds a majority within the whole code.276  
Applying the related statutes mentioned above would suggest that internal 
whistleblowers should be protected, but the whole code does not suggest 
consensus. 
2.  Existing SEC Structures That Recognize a Difference 
Among Internal Whistleblowers 
Corporate securities auditors and attorneys must follow existing SEC 
procedures to report wrongdoing to the SEC.277  Under these rules, auditors 
and attorneys are not allowed to report wrongdoing to the SEC until they 
have already done so to their employer.278  Under the Securities Exchange 
 
 275. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 276. The word “whistleblower” is used throughout the U.S. Code.  Many of these statutes 
have made a distinction between internal and external whistleblowers. See Tax Relief and 
Healthcare Act of 2006, 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2012) (providing awards to whistleblowers 
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enforcement action); Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, 31 U.S.C. § 5328 
(providing protection for external whistleblower brokers and whistleblower dealers who 
provide information to “the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, or any Federal 
supervisory agency” in furtherance of the act); VA Patient Protection Act of 2016, 38 U.S.C. 
§§ 731–32 (allowing internal veterans’ benefits whistleblowers to file a “whistleblower 
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whistleblowers against adverse employment actions); Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 2902, 42 
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Atomic Energy Act of 1954”); Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 
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Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a) (prohibiting any “air 
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 § 3164, 50 U.S.C. § 2702 (protecting internal 
whistleblowers within the Department of Energy’s defense activities who report a violation 
to, among others, the Inspector General of the Department of Energy).  This is not an 
exhaustive list of the relevant whistleblower protections within the U.S. Code, because 
Congress may protect whistleblowers without explicitly stating so.  One example is the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1790b(a)(1).  Congress initially titled a subsection of the act “Prohibition against 
discrimination against whistleblowers” but later changed the section title to “In general.”  See 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 
§ 251(b)(1), 105 Stat. 2236, 2331–32.  Congress left untouched the substance of the law, which 
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relevant authorities. See 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(a). 
 277. See supra Part III.B.4.b. 
 278. See supra notes 257–59 and accompanying text. 
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Act, auditors of a public company are required to “inform the appropriate 
level of the management” of illegal acts unless those acts are 
inconsequential.279  If management fails to take appropriate remedial action, 
auditors are required to report to the corporation’s board of directors.280  An 
auditor may only report illegal acts to the Commission if management or the 
board fails to take appropriate remedial action.281 
Under the SEC’s “standards of professional conduct for attorneys 
appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the 
representation of issuers,” attorneys are required to report material violations 
of securities laws to the corporation’s chief legal counsel or CEO.282  If 
neither the corporation’s legal counsel nor CEO take appropriate remedial 
action, the attorney is required to report the violation to the audit or other 
appropriate committee of the board of directors.283  Rule 3 of the SEC’s 
standards of professional conduct “contemplates an attorney reporting to the 
Commission only after internal reporting.”284  Because of these requirements 
imposed on auditors and attorneys, “any retaliation would almost always 
precede Commission reporting.”285  Therefore, it is unlikely that either would 
gain protection under Dodd-Frank if the act only protects reports made to the 
Commission.286 
Similarly, when the SEC interpreted Dodd-Frank’s bounty provisions, it 
delineated along similar lines those corporate personnel who usually would 
not be eligible for whistleblowing awards.287  The SEC made this distinction 
by defining the criteria for original information.288  Such employees usually 
include corporate officers and directors who have learned of the violation in 
connection with the company’s compliance processes,289 internal and 
 
 279. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B). 
 280. Id. § 78j-1(b)(2). 
 281. Id. § 78j-1(b)(3). 
 282. Id. § 7245. 
 283. Id. § 7245(2). 
 284. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, 801 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing 17 C.F.R. 
§ 205.3(d)(2) (2016)). 
 285. Id. at 151. 
 286. Id. at 152.  However, this has not prevented attorneys from trying.  In Danon v. 
Vanguard Grp., Inc., No. 15-6864, 2016 WL 2988987 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2016), an 
“experienced tax attorney” sued his former employer, Vanguard, under whistleblower 
protection claims. Id. at *1. 
 287. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,317 
(June 13, 2011) (“[W]e have identified by title or function specific categories of personnel to 
whom the rules apply.”). 
 288. Rules 21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(A)–(C) describe “three categories of persons” whom the SEC 
“will not treat as having ‘independent knowledge’ . . . for purposes of a whistleblower 
submission . . . .” Id.  “Independent knowledge” is required to qualify for a whistleblowing 
award. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 289. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(A).  However, the rule does not preclude officers 
from obtaining an award “in all circumstances.” See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and 
Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,318–19 (clarifying the exceptions to 17 C.F.R. 240.21F-
4(b)(iii)).  The rule also clarifies in subsection (vi) that the bar will extend to the recipients of 
an officer’s information such as her assistant. Id. at 34,321.  However, this rule has not kept 
corporate officers from trying to receive protection. See Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 
No. 14-C-352, 2016 WL 4507317, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2016) (noting that the 
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contracted employees who are responsible for internal compliance,290 anyone 
who learns information through a communication subject to attorney-client 
privilege,291 and nearly all other persons retained to perform internal 
investigations or inquiries into possible violations of the law.292  In doing so, 
the SEC aimed to prevent individuals from using a whistleblower submission 
in a way that “might undermine the proper operation of internal compliance 
systems.”293  Therefore, these personnel who provide nonoriginal 
information make up the group of internal whistleblowers who likely would 
never receive protection from Dodd-Frank in an external-only 
interpretation.294  But they also make up the group of internal whistleblowers 
who cannot be granted full protection without frustrating the goals of 
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.295 
IV.  WHETHER, WHICH, AND HOW INTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWERS 
SHOULD BE PROTECTED 
As of yet, courts, politicians, and scholars alike have recognized only three 
possible solutions to the present circuit split:  (1) either the statute should be 
interpreted as ambiguous and courts should defer to the SEC’s interpretation 
protecting all internal whistleblowers,296 (2) the statute should be interpreted 
as unambiguous and courts should protect only those external whistleblowers 
who report directly to the SEC,297 or (3) Congress should enact legislation 
adopting the SEC’s interpretation and adding more protections to additional 
classes of whistleblowers.298 
The solutions presented by the SEC, the Second and Fifth Circuits, and the 
WARN Act all fail to overcome insurmountable interpretive flaws.299  
Additionally, each presents policy challenges that betray the original 
purposes behind Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank because they provide all-
 
plaintiff’s compliant arises out of “his termination from the position of CEO of Defendant 
Orion Energy Systems”), appeal filed, No. 16-3502 (7th Cir. Sept. 23, 2016). 
 290. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(B)–(C); Securities Whistleblower Incentives and 
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282–84 and accompanying text.  Prohibiting the use of attorney-client privileged information 
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or-nothing protections for internal whistleblowers.300  However, 
whistleblower regulations under the Securities Exchange Act, the American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Act, the Consumer Financial Protection Act, and 
Sarbanes-Oxley suggest not only that internal whistleblowers should be 
protected but that certain internal whistleblowers should be protected 
differently.301 
This Note proposes the following solution:  (1) when an employer 
terminates an external whistleblower, the employer should bear the burden 
of proving that the termination was not retaliatory; (2) when an employer 
terminates an internal whistleblower who has provided original information, 
the employer should bear the burden of proving that the termination was not 
retaliatory; and (3) when an employer terminates an internal whistleblower 
who has provided nonoriginal information, the internal whistleblower should 
bear the burden of proving that the termination was retaliatory.302 
As demonstrated above, the Sarbanes-Oxley integration within Dodd-
Frank makes section 922 sufficiently ambiguous to warrant deference to the 
SEC’s interpretation.303  The reasoning behind the SEC’s interpretation, 
however, is internally inconsistent and runs counter to the goals motivating 
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.304 
The case for external whistleblowers is unequivocal and their protection is 
undisputed.  Whether the information provided is “original” or not, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i) protects a whistleblower who provides “information” to 
the SEC.305  For this reason, external whistleblowers are explicitly granted 
protection under the act and the burden of proof should remain with their 
employers to demonstrate a nonretaliatory justification for terminating such 
a whistleblower. 
However, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), where Dodd-Frank integrates 
Sarbanes-Oxley, says nothing about the type of information that earns 
protection.306  While Sarbanes-Oxley protects a whistleblower who provides 
“information” to “a person with supervisory authority over the employee,”307 
it never distinguishes between information and original information in the 
way Dodd-Frank does.308 
In 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4, the SEC distinguishes between information and 
original information for the purposes of whistleblower rewards in an effort to 
prevent individuals from using whistleblowing in a way that circumvents the 
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goals of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.309  However, protection against 
termination is a reward in itself.310  Without similarly distinguishing in the 
case of whistleblower protections, the SEC’s rule may still allow certain 
internal whistleblower reports to circumvent the goals of Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank.311 
Therefore, based on the motives guiding Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank,312 and the related structures mentioned above,313 the best 
interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s internal whistleblower 
protections must treat those who provide original information differently 
from those who provide nonoriginal information. 
Whether as a matter of judicial interpretation, administrative rulemaking, 
or legislative lawmaking, internal whistleblowers who provide original 
information should bear no burden to demonstrate that their termination was 
retaliatory.  Internal whistleblowers who do not provide original information 
should bear the burden of proving that their termination was in retaliation for 
their internal whistleblower report.  Treating these types of internal 
whistleblowers differently is an interpretation guided by related 
whistleblower regimes,314 reflects the existing structures within the SEC,315 
and more effectively accomplishes the goals of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank by balancing necessary whistleblower protections316 with the 
deference corporations need to manage effective internal compliance 
systems.317 
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